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The CIPD is the professional body for HR and people 
development. The not-for-profit organisation champions 
better work and working lives and has been setting the 
benchmark for excellence in people and organisation 
development for more than 100 years. It has more than 
145,000 members across the world, provides thought 
leadership through independent research on the world of 
work, and offers professional training and accreditation for 
those working in HR and learning and development.
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Foreword
How organisations create value 
and for whom are questions that 
in the fairly recent past have 
become much harder to answer 
clearly. The Great Recession, the 
growth of digital-age business 
models, and declining trust in 
corporations mean that the 
question of ‘who gains from work’ 
is now one which requires deep 
political, social, philosophical 
and academic debate. For the 
CIPD, this debate is central to our 
purpose of championing better 
work and working lives, and as 
such is an important one for the 
HR profession to take the lead in. 
This report examines how work 
generates value, and the capacity 
for organisations and individuals 
to benefit from work. In doing so, 
it highlights some real challenges 
and opportunities the HR 
profession faces when considering 
workplaces today. Creating 
value for financial stakeholders, 
employees and the community 
requires a balance which in many 
complex organisations is hard 
to reach. With this research we 
hope to highlight the challenge in 
understanding this balance, the 
business models and stakeholders 
involved, and the kinds of 
measures we can create to map 
the outcomes of work. 
We are excited by the prospect of 
debating the ideas and findings 
surfaced by this work, and we 
hope that by doing so we will 
help to develop the important 
discussion about a future world of 
work that is beneficial to all. 
Edward Houghton
Senior Research Adviser, Human 
Capital and Governance
CIPD
‘This report 
examines how work 
generates value, 
and the capacity 
for organisations 
and individuals to 
benefit from work.’
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Introduction
The creation of value – through work 
– lies at the heart of all productive 
activity. Value is created in a wide 
variety of domains. In the context 
of paid work and employment, 
its creation rests largely with 
the organisational activities of 
workers/employees, managers and 
entrepreneurs. There are a number 
of academic, practitioner and 
policy debates that focus on how 
value is created – most recently 
in the areas of human resources 
management (HRM), related to 
high-performance work systems, 
performance and productivity, 
and workplace innovation (Guest 
et al 2012, Oeij et al 2017). Central 
to these debates is the role of 
effective acquisition, deployment 
and development of human capital 
in how and how much value is 
created, as well as the role and 
impact of organisational leadership 
and governance, and managerial 
approaches and practices, on value-
creation outcomes.
However, few of these debates link 
analysis of the creation of value to 
how value is captured and by whom. 
In discussing the value process, clarity 
of terminology is important, not least 
because what constitutes value can 
be contested. Value is commonly 
understood as ‘worth’; however, 
not everything of value has an 
economic worth. Domestic labour in 
the family creates value but it rarely 
delivers realisable economic value, 
though it undoubtedly contributes 
to value-creation in firms and in 
society. Our focus in this report is 
on realisable economic value. 
In the business context, value at 
its simplest level can be defined 
as the excess of benefits or 
returns relative to the producer’s 
costs (money, time, and effort). 
Value-creation is an important 
part of an integrated process. It is 
developed through organisations 
and the work of employees and 
entrepreneurs. However, value can 
also be extracted (for example 
through disposal of assets) or 
captured through income flows 
between individuals and groups 
from the existing pool of value-
added against which stakeholders 
make competing claims for wages, 
investment or distribution to 
shareholders (Froud et al 2014, 
Mazzucato and Shipman 2014). 
Therefore, value should be treated 
as the flow of firm and inter-firm 
resources, subject to discourses 
and practices of capture by 
competing and co-operating 
economic actors.
For the private sector, value is 
created in firms and realised 
in markets. Understanding 
these processes fully requires 
an appreciation both of their 
distinctiveness and of how these 
processes are connected. A largely 
separate set of debates engage 
with the issue of value-capture, 
dominated in recent times by a 
focus on maximising shareholder 
value (MSV) as the predominant 
approach to value-capture as 
well as critiques of MSV and 
its consequences. Maximising 
shareholder value is not the only 
approach to value – not least 
because many organisations 
have no shareholders or, where 
they exist, shareholders are not 
homogenous in their behaviour. 
But MSV not only dominates 
the discourse on value; it also 
generates and disseminates 
‘… value should 
be treated as 
the flow of firm 
and inter-firm 
resources, subject 
to discourses and 
practices of capture 
by competing 
and co-operating 
economic actors.’ 
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a language, concepts and 
practices that influence debates 
and behaviours in firms and 
organisations where MSV is not 
predominant, thus increasing its 
reach and impact beyond large 
financialised corporations into 
other sectors, sizes and types of 
organisation.
Yet there is significant potential 
in a broader and more holistic 
conception of value that takes 
into account individual and 
society impacts (KPMG 2014). A 
range of relevant debates exist 
that highlight societal impacts 
of the value-creation process, 
including those on environmental 
sustainability, corporate social 
responsibility and ethical/values-
driven or purposive organisations. 
Similarly, a number of existing 
debates highlight individual 
impact – negatively, in terms 
of the costs to individuals of 
the types of ‘bad jobs’ often 
associated with particular value 
approaches, and positively in 
debates that recognise the 
value-creating role of employees 
unleashed through good-quality 
jobs and enabling and facilitating 
management. Such debates exist, 
but in comparison with MSV 
they are diverse and fragmented, 
spanning for example human 
asset accounting and debates 
around inclusive growth, to 
illustrate but a few. 
Acknowledging that academic, 
policy and practitioner literatures 
around value are largely divided 
between value-creation and 
its capture should stimulate 
a mature and long overdue 
discussion that promotes greater 
integration, acknowledging the 
separate and distinct processes 
of value-creation and extraction/
capture while examining the 
relationship between the two in 
varied organisational contexts and 
analysing how these processes 
are reflected in business models, 
strategies and organisational or 
firm-level practice. 
Crucially, any analysis of value 
should acknowledge that 
employers can and do make 
choices in defining their value 
proposition. They do so by 
adopting business models that 
have implications not only for how 
value is defined and recognised 
and for the ways in which human, 
social and intellectual capital 
(IC) is attracted, developed and 
maintained in the process of 
value-creation, but also for who 
shares and how in value-capture. 
Value is delivered through 
business models that both reflect 
and shape value-creation and 
capture, yet these offer few 
openings to HR professionals 
to engage in discussions about 
value at an organisational level. 
Put simply, while HR debates and 
practitioners acknowledge the 
importance of human capital and 
people strategy, and how these 
relate to value-creation, these are 
rarely linked explicitly to value-
capture. These choices, however, 
are constrained significantly 
by macro-structural economic, 
regulatory and political influences 
that support shareholder value 
pressures and priorities. Debates 
on value are, therefore, largely 
focused at a macro level and 
are economic in orientation. 
Yet a robust understanding 
of value needs to transcend 
distinct academic disciplines and 
there is considerable potential 
in synthesising insights from 
political economy, accounting 
and employment relations 
perspectives.
This review aims to stimulate 
a broader and more integrated 
debate on value-creation and 
capture and their implications 
for organisational practice. It 
addresses the need to analyse 
‘Value is delivered 
through business 
models that both 
reflect and shape 
value-creation and 
capture, yet these 
offer few openings 
to HR professionals 
to engage in 
discussions about 
value at an 
organisational 
level.’
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any relationship between value-
creation and capture in examining 
the impact of the value process 
on organisational governance, 
leadership and management, work 
and employment, and HR practice. 
Consequently, this review spans a 
broad terrain. It is structured  
as follows. 
This report (Part 1) focuses on 
understanding and analysing 
value. Section 1 introduces 
value systems in organisations 
as processes of value-creation, 
realisation and capture. Section 2 
outlines the dominant shareholder 
value perspective and less 
prominent stakeholder value 
perspectives. Drawing on these 
models, Section 3 sets out our 
thoughts on how to integrate 
existing discussions of value 
and to make these meaningful 
in a workplace context. Section 
4 illustrates our approach to 
analysing value in relation to 
business models by examining 
a number of ‘ideal type’ 
examples of business models in 
practice. Section 5 considers the 
implications of approaches to 
value-creation for organisational 
leadership and governance. 
Section 6 assesses the relationship 
between value-creation and 
associated business models on 
the one hand, and organisational 
approaches to compensation and 
reward on the other. We conclude 
Part 1 with summary reflections in 
Section 7. 
The second report (Part 2) 
focuses on measuring and 
reporting on value. It develops 
our analysis in relation to 
contemporary discussions of 
current and potential future 
metrics, including HR metrics in 
Section 1, accounting metrics and, 
in particular, on the potential of 
integrated reporting, in Section 
2, and on the macro-level metrics 
relevant to value in Section 3. 
Throughout Part 2, we attempt to 
signal alternative perspectives on 
creating and capturing value. 
We conclude Part 2 with a 
synthesis of the preceding 
discussion and some reflections 
on possible policy and practice 
interventions in relation to the 
value process emanating from the 
more holistic approach that we 
have proposed. 
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1 Value systems in organisations
To frame our discussion of value 
in private organisations, we pose a 
simple systems model comprising 
inputs, transformation processes, 
outputs and outcomes. A variety of 
inputs or capitals (financial, human, 
intellectual/knowledge and social) 
are brought together in a firm and 
undergo a range of transformation 
processes in which value is 
created. This value is realised in 
the marketplace and then captured 
or distributed in the form of 
wages, investment, dividends and 
retained profits, while also creating 
a number of proximate and less 
proximate, direct and indirect, non-
financial and financial outcomes for 
a broad group of stakeholders with 
some connection to the firm. These 
include work experience, skills 
development and health outcomes, 
for example, for workers, and 
wider externalities for citizens and 
society, including tax revenues and 
pollution.
Academic analyses of the value 
system tend to focus on its distinct 
elements, reflecting disciplinary 
orientations. Sociologists and 
scholars of work and employment 
focus heavily on the inputs to 
the system and the operation 
of transformation processes. 
Scholars of accounting, economics 
and finance focus more on the 
outputs and, to a lesser extent, the 
outcomes of the value system. 
Intellectual capital
Recent years have seen growing 
interest in inputs into the value 
process in relation to intellectual 
capital (IC) in particular, 
broadening longstanding debates 
on human capital in light of 
developments in information 
technology and knowledge-
based businesses. Definitions of 
intellectual capital have adopted 
wide views of forms of knowledge 
in organisations, including not 
only the outcomes of knowledge-
intensive work, such as IP and 
patents, but also the tacit potential 
of organisational actors. 
The OECD describes intellectual 
capital as the ‘economic value of 
two categories of intangible assets 
of a company: (1) organisational 
(“structural”) capital; and (2) 
human capital’ (Petty and Guthrie 
2000, p158). Structural capital 
refers instead to proprietary 
software systems, organisational 
processes, systems, databases, 
patents, IP, distribution networks 
and supply chains (Petty and 
Guthrie 2000). Human capital, 
at the level of the organisation, 
encompasses not only skills and 
expertise but also motivation 
of the human resources within 
the organisation – such as the 
knowledge, skills and abilities of 
staff, but also of the wider network 
accessible to the organisation, 
namely customers and suppliers. 
Other studies of intellectual capital 
have included relational capital, 
that is, the network of relationships 
on which the organisation draws 
(Kianto et al 2014). 
Value-creation 
The existence of these forms of 
capital in an organisation does not 
explicitly mean that they can be – 
or are – automatically exploited/
exploitable by the organisation in 
value-creation. Rather, ‘such capital 
exists and can be considered an 
asset or a resource available in 
the organization, and that it can 
‘Recent years have 
seen growing 
interest in inputs 
into the value 
process in relation 
to intellectual 
capital.’
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be potentially useful in value 
creation’ (Kianto et al 2014, p364). 
Therefore, how these assets are 
developed, managed and deployed 
are crucial components for value-
creation. 
While this rising interest in 
capitals reflects increasing 
recognition of the role of human 
and intellectual capital in value-
creation, such recognition does 
not often feed through into 
discussions of value-capture. Petty 
and Guthrie (2000) note that 
intangible assets in organisations, 
such as staff competencies, 
customer relationships, models 
and computer/administrative 
systems, receive no recognition 
in the traditional financial and 
management reporting models. 
This is arguably in contrast to 
the expenditures of processes 
and practices associated with 
the development, maintenance 
and exploitation of these assets 
– for example through training, 
development and reward 
structures. 
Importance of an integrated 
perspective 
While the value process in 
organisations is integrated, much 
of our analysis and understanding 
of this process is discrete. This 
has real implications for day-to-
day practice in organisations, 
particularly in relation to how 
people are managed. Focusing 
on human capital in the value-
creation process to the relative 
exclusion of its role in value 
captured undermines the ‘required 
degree of stability and capacity 
for investment in firm-specific 
assets’ to nurture and harness 
talent through high-performance 
work systems (Thompson and 
Harley 2012, p1373). We argue 
that the distance between 
debates on human capital and 
on value-capture have, in recent 
years, expanded as shareholder 
value perspectives have gained 
ground over other conceptions 
of the business organisation. 
Understanding how this has 
arisen, and its implications for how 
value is defined and measured, 
necessitates analysis informed by a 
range of disciplinary perspectives 
and which addresses the value 
process as a whole. 
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2  Contrasting perspectives and practices
Human capital and beyond
The simple system outlined above 
conceals a plethora of research 
and debate. Human capital as a 
source of value for firms (and for 
individuals) has arguably been the 
dominant debate at an academic, 
policy and practitioner level for 
many decades (CIPD 2017a). The 
classic claim that ‘people are 
our greatest asset’ and the main 
source of competitive advantage 
is an implicit statement about 
the relationship between human 
capital and value-creation (Pfeffer 
1994, Becker et al 1997). 
The role of HRM 
There have been substantial 
debates in the areas of HRM, 
strategic HRM, and in the field of 
management – particularly related 
to resource-based views (RBV) of 
the firm which have argued that 
the knowledge and skills of the 
organisation’s employees are a 
source of sustained competitive 
advantage (Barney 2000, Barney 
et al 2001, Løwendahl et al 2001). 
Among some scholars, this has 
led to an increased interest in, 
and focus on, the management 
of intellectual capital and 
organisational learning processes. 
These scholars argue that HRM and 
HR practitioners have a central role 
in the design and development of 
processes that attract, motivate, 
and develop the valuable and rare 
skills and abilities of employees 
(Boxall and Purcell 2000).
There is also a diverse and 
established literature which 
explores the links between 
workplace practices aimed at 
maximising and optimising the 
human, social and intellectual 
capital of the workforce. 
These literatures include high-
performance work systems 
(for example Appelbaum et al 
2000) and theories of dynamic 
capabilities (Teece et al 1997), 
Business 
and 
strategic 
initiatives
Design 
of human 
resource 
management 
system
Employee 
skills; 
employee 
motivation; 
job design 
and work 
structures
Productivity; 
creativity; 
discretionary 
effort
Improved 
operating 
performance
Profits and 
growth
Market 
value
Figure 1: A model of HR – shareholder value relationship (reproduced from Becker et al 1994, p40)
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focusing on the potential to align 
the efforts and motivations of 
workers with organisational and 
managerial changes that improve 
efficiency through more effective 
deployment of (often skilled) 
human capital (Ichniowski et al 
1996).
Value-capture
While few commentators doubt 
the importance of human and 
intellectual capital to value-
creation, such perspectives have 
little to say about value-extraction 
and capture. For example, as Petty 
and Guthrie (2000) note, these 
intangible assets in organisations, 
as well as the relationships with 
customers and internal technical 
and social systems, receive little 
to no recognition in the traditional 
financial and management 
reporting models. Rather, these 
systems and the costs associated 
with acquiring, developing, 
maintaining and deploying these 
assets are instead considered as 
expenditures – or the avoidance 
of new expenditures. Acquiring 
and accumulating knowledge 
and competencies within the 
organisation may not be enough. 
In itself, the stock of knowledge 
does not create sustained 
competitive advantage, but rather 
it is now applied and deployed 
to create value (Løwendahl et al 
2001). 
Levels of value and contexts
There is also the issue of unit of 
analysis. While human capital has 
tended to be conceptualised from 
the perspective of the individual 
(Schultz 1960, for example Becker 
1994, p196), individual-level 
characteristics become aggregated 
to the organisational or unit level 
in debates on organisational 
intellectual capital and intangible 
assets. However, there has tended 
to be a lack of distinction between 
individual capacities which 
directly influence unit-relevant 
outcomes and unit-level capacities 
influencing unit-relevant outcomes 
(Ployhart et al 2014).
These are examples of definitional 
and conceptual limitations related 
to intellectual and human capitals 
raised in what might be called the 
‘internal critique’ and help explain 
why high-performance practices 
are a minority of practices utilised 
in a minority of firms (Godard 
2004, Kaufman 2010). However, 
the limitations of the human capital 
narrative with respect to value-
capture go deeper than this. Naïve 
optimism also stems from neglect 
of context and any serious account 
of the structural constraints on 
mainstream business models. In an 
increasingly financialised economy, 
the dominant metric of ‘best 
practice’ is ‘most profits’ (Kaufman 
2010, Thompson 2011b). We will 
examine these business models in 
more detail later. First, we want 
to examine other literatures that 
may be better placed to bring 
something new to explaining the 
contested relationship between 
value-creation and capture.
Disciplinary perspectives on value
Insights from a political economy 
perspective largely address the 
value process at a macro level, 
identifying wider structural, 
ideological and political forces 
that shape approaches to value 
and, crucially, who shares in 
value-capture. Such debates 
focus particularly (though not 
exclusively) on exposition and 
critique of maximising shareholder 
value (MSV). This approach to 
value-capture emanates from 
shareholders’ property rights 
and principal–agent theory as 
it applies to shareholders and 
management control in the 
interests of shareholders. MSV 
is largely silent on or indifferent 
to how value is created so long 
as its capture is maximised in 
shareholders’ interests. 
The accounting and finance 
literature, on the other hand, 
is more closely concerned 
with value-capture, although 
this overriding concern has 
implications for processes and 
practices of value-creation, 
for example via management 
control systems, performance 
management systems and reward 
systems. From an accounting 
perspective, debates on human 
capital accounting begin to 
address the relationship between 
value-creation and capture, while 
research in social accounting 
highlights some of the wider 
ramifications of value processes in 
businesses. 
The broad literatures on work, 
employment and human resource 
management are at their essence, 
and increasingly explicitly, focused 
on value-creation. From analyses 
of individual motivation and 
engagement, through debates 
on group/team working and 
contribution, and more recently to 
debates on the configuration of 
HR practices that drive business 
performance, at their core much 
of the work in HRM is about 
driving value-creation. However, 
outside of what are increasingly 
seen as ‘old fashioned’ or 
irrelevant debates in the industrial 
relations tradition, much of the 
contemporary HRM literature is 
strikingly silent on value-capture.
Yet value is an integrated process, 
encompassing the processes 
of creation, realisation and 
capture. Therefore, the degree of 
separation between disciplinary 
perspectives on value and their 
distinct emphases on discrete 
elements of the value process 
is unhelpful for a broader 
understanding of value. A broader 
multidisciplinary lens is required 
to interrogate the dominant MSV 
model, and is provided in the 
sections below.
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The dominant model – maximising 
shareholder value 
Political economy perspectives 
draw on the disciplines of 
economics, sociology and 
political science to examine the 
basic dynamics and institutional 
underpinnings of production and 
wealth-creation. Such perspectives 
are, therefore, well placed to 
illuminate questions of value and 
work. In this section, we want to 
focus on contributions made to 
explain the characteristics and 
consequences of the maximising 
shareholder value (MSV) model 
that has dominated the global 
economy and firm behaviour in the 
last three decades. 
MSV ideas and practices have their 
origins in agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976, Jensen 1986). 
This was directed towards reducing 
perceived managerial opportunism 
and subjecting them to the 
discipline of the market, while 
simultaneously promoting a model 
of corporate resource allocation 
based on investor sovereignty 
(Appelbaum et al 2013). 
Conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers over 
payout policies are especially 
severe when the organisation 
generates substantial free cash 
flow. The problem is how to 
motivate managers to disgorge 
the cash rather than investing 
it at below cost or wasting it 
on organisational inefficiencies. 
(Jensen 1986, p323)
This constituted a fundamental 
challenge to the post-war order 
of managerial capitalism, in which 
professional managers were seen 
as stewards of the large firm on 
behalf of a variety of stakeholders 
(Erturk et al 2004). This was not 
a purely theoretical argument. 
Economic uncertainty and 
industrial decline in the 1970s and 
1980s gave proponents of investor-
led models powerful leverage to 
attack management stewardship 
of the firm, as well as legitimating 
an active market for corporate 
control (for example through a 
wave of hostile takeovers by new 
financial actors) and a series of 
deregulatory policy measures in 
the US, UK and elsewhere (Green 
et al 2008, Thompson and Harley 
2012). 
The political economy critique 
of the dominant MSV model 
challenges it precisely on the 
terrain of value. With the emphasis 
on disgorging cash flow and value 
delivered to investors, MSV models 
have a systemic bias towards 
issues of value-extraction and 
transfer rather than value-creation 
(Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013, 
Mazzucato and Shipman 2014). 
Agency theory links higher rewards 
to greater risk-taking by investors, 
yet underplays the collective 
and cumulative character of a 
central source of value-creation 
– innovation – in which various 
stakeholders, notably labour 
and the state, invest without 
guaranteed returns. The following 
sub-section examines how 
shareholder value has typically 
operated at various levels. 
Shareholder value in action
Political economy literatures 
identify three spheres of socio-
economic change associated with 
the enactment of MSV models: the 
macro-economic level, meso level 
of the firm and inter-firm, and the 
micro level of the workplace. 
Macro-economic level
At a macro level, scholars refer 
to finance-dominated growth or 
accumulation regimes (Krippner 
2005, Stockhammer 2008, 
Lapavitsas 2011). The source of 
profits shows a clear shift from 
product markets and production 
to financial assets, with a growing 
share of such assets and the profits 
‘Political economy 
perspectives draw 
on the disciplines 
of economics, 
sociology and 
political science 
to examine the 
basic dynamics 
and institutional 
underpinnings of 
production and 
wealth-creation.’
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1  See Section 6 for a fuller explanation of this ratio.
of financial corporations relative 
to GDP. In financialised economies, 
capital markets move beyond 
merely an intermediary role to 
become the main driving force 
of firm and to some extent state 
and household behaviours (Erturk 
et al 2004), with banks and new 
investment funds such as private 
equity centre stage. Non-financial 
corporations (NFC), however, also 
become financial actors, with more 
focus on leveraging value from 
financial extractions and assets 
compared with the rate of return 
on operational investment (Milberg 
2008, Müller 2013). 
Meso level: firm and inter-firm 
behaviour
As shown in the 2008 global 
financial crisis, such macro-level 
regimes have proven unstable, in 
large part because of their reliance 
on growth through corporate and 
household debt. This need not 
concern us here. A more relevant 
focus is on research into the meso 
level – the impact of MSV on firm 
and inter-firm behaviours. From 
the early and influential work of 
Williams (2000) and colleagues, 
the focus was on the centrality 
of value-extraction through 
financial engineering. This takes 
a number of forms. Firms, often 
of a conglomerate or portfolio 
nature, were increasingly treated 
as bundles of assets, with the 
more disposable sold off and 
restructuring through delayering, 
disaggregation, merger and 
leveraged buy-out becoming a 
prominent part of the corporate 
landscape (Dore 2008). Corporate 
governance and strategy became 
increasingly focused on meeting 
capital market requirements, 
especially estimations of future 
performance and the perceived 
intrinsic value of stock (Cushen 
and Thompson 2016). 
The mechanisms for delivering on 
these expectations are primarily a 
variety of valuation factors used 
by institutional investors (such as 
return on earnings, price/earnings 
ratio1), as well as ‘value-based’ 
management tools promoted 
by large consultancies (Williams 
2000). One of the valuation factors 
used by Bank of America/Merrill 
Lynch (2006) is share repurchase. 
Lazonick’s (2009) investigations 
have demonstrated the remarkable 
degree to which share buybacks 
have played a key role in boosting 
equity values. Unsurprisingly, if 
companies are sitting on cash, 
distributing it in dividends or 
buying their own shares, there is 
less room for the creation of new 
value through internal, long-term 
investment in human and physical 
capital or research and innovation 
(Orhangazi 2008, Lazonick and 
Mazzucato 2013, Froud et al 2014). 
A bias towards a short-term, 
transactional and speculative 
approach also tends to undermine 
the development of relationship-
specific investments with 
customers and other stakeholders 
across value and supply chains 
(Appelbaum et al 2013, Parker et 
al 2017).
We referred earlier to the goal 
of agency theorists to ‘discipline’ 
senior managers. However, such 
coercion has been decidedly 
beneficial to the corporate layer 
of management, if not to the 
corporations themselves. The 
trend towards a widening of the 
pay gap between the average 
worker and senior executives has 
been widely observed (van der 
Zwan 2014). What is sometimes 
less obvious is the role played 
by stock options and simple 
payment in stocks in aligning 
MSV strategies with rewards and 
executive loyalty (Lazonick 2016). 
It has been widely argued that the 
HR function is perceived by many 
employees as playing a central role 
in developing these new reward 
systems at a time when real wages 
have been stagnant or declining. 
This undermines its legitimacy as 
a broader steward of the social 
contract (Kochan 2007).
Micro level: the workplace
A third, micro level focusing on 
how MSV plays out at workplace 
level has most direct relevance 
to the work and value theme and 
any attempt to identify outcomes 
and mechanisms. Unfortunately, 
reflecting the disciplinary 
orientations of political economy 
literatures, it is the sphere that 
has received least attention. A key 
problem of analysis and method 
has been that we are dealing 
with multi-levelled structures 
and practices, where it is difficult 
to specify cause and effect at 
the micro level. For example, a 
comparative collection of studies of 
restructuring practices and labour 
outcomes associated with new 
investment funds in nine countries 
(Gospel et al 2014) confirmed 
much of the above analysis of 
financialised corporate behaviours. 
However, it is argued that the 
linkages between the ‘transmission 
mechanisms’ of shorter time 
horizons, divestment strategies 
and shifts in the balance of power 
amongst stakeholders are largely 
negative for labour, but indirect. 
A plausible indirect link between 
MSV and negative workplace 
outcomes was argued in a much-
cited paper by Thompson (2003). 
The focus was on the way that 
the perpetual restructuring 
driven by new forms of value-
extraction undermined local 
high-performance, mutual-gain 
bargains between management 
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and labour. Such productivity 
bargains require conditions of 
job security and investment 
in skills, reward systems and 
opportunities that are difficult to 
sustain under MSV models. The 
result is a fundamental disconnect 
between employer objectives of 
enhanced discretionary effort in 
the work domain and increased 
disposability and insecurity in the 
sphere of employment. 
The disconnection perspective 
has proven to be a fruitful line of 
further contemporary workplace 
research (for an overview, see 
Thompson 2013). That gap 
between values-led narratives 
around employee branding and 
commitment, and the reality 
of value-extraction-based 
practices shown in case studies 
is particularly problematic for 
HR (Cushen and Thompson 2012, 
McCann 2013). Clark’s work on 
the impact of the private equity 
business model, particularly in the 
Automobile Association, built on 
the disconnection theme (see for 
example Clark 2009, 2011, Clark 
and Macey 2015). A private equity 
takeover of the AA led first to 
pressures to service the debt and 
dividend payments, and then to 
targets of ‘managing out of the 
business’ 3,400 employees. 
This shows a direct link between 
value-extraction and negative 
labour outcomes. Such links are, 
perhaps, easier to identify with 
private equity variants whose 
business model is heavily reliant 
on extracting higher than average 
returns and servicing debt in 
short timeframes. While this can 
be achieved in various ways, cost 
reduction pressures frequently 
lead to ‘hard’ HR practices, value 
transfers from worker wages, 
pensions and benefits, and work 
intensification (Appelbaum and 
Batt 2014, Gospel et al 2014). 
More recent work by Cushen 
and Thompson (2016) also tries 
to identify, if not demonstrable 
cause and effect relations 
between financialised practices 
and labour outcomes, at least a 
clearer understanding of some 
of the mechanisms involved. 
As indicated earlier, emphasis 
is put primarily on financialised 
targets that lead to distinctive 
accounting metrics and measures 
that can be operationalised 
through budgeting processes. For 
example, operational expenditure 
(or OPEX) reduction is seen as 
a reliable means of signalling 
delivery of MSV targets and in 
turn is associated with headcount 
reduction, work intensification and 
tightened performance measures. 
Stakeholder models as alternative
Stakeholder theories acknowledge 
the collective and social context 
of sustainable business and 
value-creation in analysing the 
relationship between firms and 
society, the role of stakeholders 
beyond shareholders, their 
interests and goals, the process 
by which stakeholder interests 
are represented in businesses and 
how value is distributed across 
stakeholders (Freeman 1984). 
Stakeholder theory is a theory 
of organisational strategy and 
ethics rather than a theory of 
political economy (Phillips et al 
2003). In this, it operates on a 
similar terrain to discussions of the 
collective (or triple) bottom line, 
where businesses can be assessed 
in terms of the three distinct 
priorities of economic, social and 
environmental sustainability. 
Differences and similarities  
with CSR
Stakeholder theory can generally 
be distinguished from corporate 
social responsibility in terms of 
how each frame the relationship 
between firms and society. While 
much contested in its form 
‘That gap 
between values-
led narratives 
around employee 
branding and 
commitment, and 
the reality of value-
extraction based 
practices shown 
in case studies 
is particularly 
problematic for HR.’
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and impact (Banerjee 2008), 
CSR proceeds from a view of 
businesses and corporations as 
members of a moral community 
with consequent responsibilities 
arising towards society in 
general. Many CSR accounts 
are ‘pyramidal’/hierarchical in 
framing these responsibilities as 
primarily economic (the need to 
make money) and legal (acting 
lawfully in substance and in 
spirit); with ethical responsibilities 
(voluntarily doing the right thing) 
and philanthropic responsibilities 
(generosity towards the wider 
community in the absence of 
direct gains) arising thereafter – 
that is, once business (economic 
outcomes) are taken care of. 
Moreover, employee interests are in 
general absent from consideration 
in CSR practices and evaluation. 
Stakeholder theories, by contrast, 
locate firms within a broader 
institutional context where social 
legitimacy derived from reciprocal 
relationships between the firm and 
the wider society lends stability 
and sustainability to the firm. 
It is the nature of this web of 
relationships with stakeholders as 
distinct groups, rather than society 
in general – and how organisations 
should and do consider their 
interests – that distinguishes CSR 
from stakeholder theories, with 
the latter recognising a more 
differentiated and complex web 
of stakeholders. This, of course, 
opens up the possibility that some 
configurations of stakeholders can 
create and share value in ways 
that do not deliver for society 
in general, a point to which we 
return.
Who is a stakeholder?
The variety of shareholder and 
stakeholder theories means that 
these are not binary but reflect 
a range of overlapping value 
propositions. While stakeholder 
theories encompass the network 
of relationships in which business 
takes place, there is no consensus 
in the literature as to which parties 
have a ‘stake’ in a business. Some 
accounts identify stakeholders 
as anyone who is affected in any 
way by the performance of a 
business or organisation (Freeman 
1984). Some distinguish direct 
stakeholders (such as shareholders, 
workers, customers, suppliers 
and the local community) and 
indirect stakeholders (such as the 
Government, competitors and 
interest groups). 
Others distinguish normative 
stakeholders (for whose well-
being the organisation has a 
direct obligation) from derivative 
stakeholders (those who can harm 
or benefit the organisation). Real 
challenges arise in developing 
stakeholder theory with a very 
broad definition of stakeholders. 
For this reason, we follow Frooman 
(1999) and Kochan and Rubinstein 
(2000) in defining stakeholders as 
those who contribute resources to 
an organisation, bear residual risk 
and who have some power in or 
over the organisation. 
Stakeholder theory contends that 
stakeholders have some type of 
claim in relation to the actions 
and outcomes of the business. 
The nature of these claims or 
stakeholder goals is often only 
loosely specified – that workers 
have decent pay or good jobs; 
that communities are not polluted 
or exploited; that suppliers are 
not squeezed in contractual 
arrangements – the key issue 
being that rather than a single 
commitment to maximising 
shareholder value, businesses face 
multiple stakeholder objectives. 
Kochan and Rubinstein suggest 
viewing organisations along a 
continuum from those where 
primacy is given to maximising 
shareholder wealth to those that 
pursue the different objectives 
of multiple stakeholders, such as 
privately owned firms, partnerships 
and employee-owned firms. 
There is little specification in the 
literature, however, as to how these 
multiple objectives are weighted 
relative to each other (Kochan 
and Rubinstein 2000), and 
management remain, in formal and 
real terms, the decision-makers. 
Shareholders as stakeholders?
The interests and goals of 
shareholders are nonetheless 
incorporated into stakeholder 
theories in three important 
ways. First, shareholders are 
stakeholders. 
Second, most versions of 
stakeholder theory accord 
primary stakeholder status to 
shareholders and to managers 
who represent their interests, with 
a responsibility for them to take 
other stakeholders into account, 
not for all stakeholders to be 
treated equally. As Kochan and 
Rubinstein (2000) note, there is 
nothing exact in how stakeholders’ 
interests are specified, and these 
interests do not necessarily imply 
power over a business, simply that 
the business should act with these 
stakeholder interests in mind. The 
theory does not imply that all 
stakeholders (however they may 
be identified) should be equally 
involved in all processes and 
decisions (Donaldson and Preston 
1995). 
Third, as Berman and colleagues 
(1999) have suggested, being 
mindful of the interests of some 
non-shareholders might also 
maximise wealth for equity 
shareholders, and while this 
position is widely contested, there 
is evidence that in the context 
of private/for-profit businesses, 
stakeholder theory is clearly 
consistent with value maximisation 
(Phillips et al 2003). 
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Stakeholder management 
processes
Stakeholder theory encompasses 
not only the outcomes of 
organisational decision-making 
in terms of who shares in value-
capture, but also the processes 
underpinning a stakeholder 
approach within organisations. 
Different stakeholder interests 
must be reflected in the 
organisation’s governance 
arrangements, performance 
outcomes and key metrics in order 
to deliver and distribute value 
in line with multiple stakeholder 
objectives (Kochan and Rubinstein 
2000). These authors argue that 
this requires a shift from a control-
based governance model (of 
managers by shareholders and 
of employees by managers) to 
one built around co-ordination, 
co-operation and conflict 
resolution and aimed at creating 
and distributing value in ways that 
maintain stakeholder commitment.
Some level of stakeholder 
commitment is an important 
aspiration of both instrumental 
and non-instrumental stakeholder 
approaches. Stakeholder theory 
posits that the web of stakeholder 
relations within and around a 
business are not necessarily 
hostile and adversarial but can 
be constructive and can facilitate 
satisfaction of some of the 
preferences of a broad stakeholder 
group, leading to fairer or more 
equitable outcomes and a better 
distribution of benefits and risks 
across stakeholders. It is on the 
issue of material outcomes that 
shareholder and stakeholder 
theories most clearly diverge. 
Both may aim to maximise value-
creation, but differ significantly in 
relation to how and by whom value 
is captured (Phillips et al 2003). 
Levels of stakeholder analysis
Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
usefully distinguish between 
the operation of stakeholder 
theory at a descriptive level (by 
acknowledging that organisations 
affect and are affected by 
society), an instrumental level 
(effective management takes 
links to stakeholders into 
account) and at a normative 
level (where stakeholders’ rights 
provide a legitimate stake in 
how organisations are run). They 
note that the instrumental view 
is hypothetical (if stakeholder 
management is adopted, business 
outcomes will be improved), while 
the normative view is categorical 
(adopt stakeholder management 
because it is the right thing to 
do). These authors argue that 
stakeholder theory cannot be 
wholly justified, either analytically 
or empirically, in instrumental 
terms, and that the case for 
encouraging a stakeholder focus 
within businesses is ultimately a 
normative one.
A normative commitment to 
stakeholder approaches can 
be, and indeed is, enshrined 
in national institutional 
arrangements, and there is 
considerable cross-country 
variation in opportunities 
for stakeholders to influence 
businesses. Embedded (and 
statutorily underpinned) 
participation of unions in 
co-ordinated market economies 
that support social partnership 
such as Germany, Sweden and 
Finland ensures that the voice 
of employees and unions as 
stakeholders are represented in 
organisational decision-making. 
At its core, stakeholder theory 
rejects a functionalist view of the 
firm where businesses’ societal 
responsibilities are residual to 
their economic responsibilities. 
Managers themselves regularly 
report that their jobs involve 
serving a wide range of 
stakeholders (Donaldson and 
‘It is on the issue of 
material outcomes 
that shareholder 
and stakeholder 
theories most 
clearly diverge. 
Both may aim to 
maximise value-
creation, but differ 
significantly in 
relation to how and 
by whom value is 
captured.’
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Preston 1995) and managers can 
be seen as acting on behalf of 
these stakeholders and hence 
engaging in multiple, cross-
cutting and often conflicting 
‘stakeholder–agent’ relationships 
(Hill and Jones 1992). How these 
interests are balanced, and the 
implications for value-creation 
and capture, will be shaped not 
simply by managers’ normative 
orientation but by a range of 
structural, regulatory, institutional 
and organisational factors. We 
will return in Part 2 to consider 
what levers of intervention might 
support stakeholder approaches to 
the value process. 
Creating shared value: proposal 
and critique
More recently, Porter and Kramer 
(2011) have stepped into the 
stakeholder debate in their 
discussion of creating shared value 
(CSV), arguing that the decline in 
trust in, and perceived legitimacy 
of, business might be addressed 
by incorporating social objectives 
and priorities into business 
strategies. They define the creation 
of shared value as involving 
‘policies and operating practices 
that enhance the competitiveness 
of a company while simultaneously 
advancing the economic and social 
conditions in the communities in 
which it operates’. 
While much of their focus is on 
organisational-level practices, 
Porter and Kramer argue that 
their contribution is holistic in 
linking system-level practices and 
challenges to organisational-level 
practice. In this vein, they highlight 
a role for the state in setting 
‘regulations that enhance shared 
value, set goals, and stimulate 
innovation’, connecting their work, 
in Crane and colleagues’ (2014) 
view, to debates about ‘caring’ or 
‘conscious’ capitalism and taking it 
beyond some existing debates on 
corporate social responsibility.
Crane and colleagues, however, 
have delivered a lengthy critique 
of the failure by Porter and Kramer 
to address appropriately the 
relationship between economic 
and social value-creation and any 
trade-offs therein. This failure 
to acknowledge the continuous 
tension between firms and their 
stakeholders is, they contend, 
also characteristic of much of 
the stakeholder value and CSR 
debates, and they argue that: 
CSV does little to tackle any of the 
deep-rooted problems that are at 
the heart of capitalism’s legitimacy 
crisis. It seeks to ‘transform 
business thinking’ yet makes no 
mention of the strategy models 
that might need transforming (only 
CSR and capitalism are presented 
as problems that need fixing). It 
looks to solve the macro systemic 
problem of capitalism by changing 
micro firm-level behaviors. It wants 
to rethink the purpose of the 
corporation without questioning 
the sanctity of corporate self-
interest. It seeks to restore business 
legitimacy without considering 
either adherence to the rules of 
the game (compliance) or the 
role of financial markets … A true 
societal perspective, however, 
would consider many of the 
problems corporations try to deal 
with on a local and controlled level 
as systemic problems of injustice 
that require broader solutions 
embedded in democratically 
organized multi-stakeholder 
processes. (Crane et al 2014, p140)
This last suggestion is one that 
Porter and Kramer have retorted is 
not realistic. 
Barriers to wider value-capture
Stakeholder theories address, in 
part, how stakeholders contribute 
to the creation of value, and 
the distribution of value beyond 
shareholders. Yet the critique of 
‘creating shared value’ outlined 
above also highlights a key 
limitation of stakeholder theories 
in acknowledging and addressing 
the fundamental structural 
barriers that militate against non-
shareholder stakeholders sharing 
in value-capture. Moreover, in 
much of stakeholder theory, the 
potential returns to stakeholders 
are significantly under-specified, 
leaving any real shift in value-
capture highly unlikely. 
This latter issue is of most 
consequence in relation to 
workers. Stakeholder approaches 
that define a broad stakeholder 
group, and recognise distinct 
stakeholder groups as equivalent, 
attenuate the link between value-
creation and its capture – in 
particular, the crucial link between 
those who create value directly 
and the returns they accrue. 
Put simply, we contend that 
stakeholder theories are often 
insufficiently labour-centred. 
There have, however, been efforts 
to focus on the role of labour 
in so-called ‘stakeholder’ firms 
that acknowledge and give 
voice to multiple and sometimes 
competing interests and goals 
within the organisation. Kochan 
and Rubinstein’s (2000) analysis 
highlights both the crucial role 
of labour as the most significant 
business stakeholder and the 
explicit relationship between how 
value is created and claims on its 
distribution. These authors argue 
that stakeholder interdependency 
and power dispersal increases 
the potential for improving 
performance and, hence, creating 
more value through the eliciting 
of discretionary effort from 
employees and the interactions 
of groups and teams, while 
also increasing the potential 
for conflict – over processes, 
influence and value-capture – 
across internal stakeholder groups 
in particular.
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Thus, the critical organizational 
tasks for a stakeholder firm lie in 
(1) mobilizing the stakeholders 
to commit their assets in ways 
that contribute to performance, 
and (2) coordinating efforts and 
resolving conflicts that arise 
when multiple interests share 
power. For a stakeholder firm to 
function successfully, employee 
discretionary efforts need to 
be mobilized, high levels of 
communication and coordination 
are needed across groups and 
functions, and conflicts need to be 
surfaced and resolved effectively. 
Given the multiple interests that 
share power, conflict resolution 
is likely to be an especially 
critical function in stakeholder 
organizations. (Kochan and 
Rubinstein 2000, p377)
This captures precisely the 
challenges at the heart of 
stakeholder theories and of many 
extant HR debates – and, indeed, 
at the heart of the employment 
relationship – that engaging 
workers in enhancing value-
creation throws into even sharper 
contrast their relative absence 
in value-capture. This tension 
is present in critical accounts 
of high-performance work 
systems, where individualised 
rewards for high performers 
only are prioritised (Ramsay et 
al 2000), in discussions of the 
decline of union membership 
and in the reach and influence 
of collective bargaining (Traxler 
1996) and the reduced ability 
of unions to deliver a greater 
share of value for labour, and in 
accounts of workplace innovation 
where employees are invited 
and encouraged to deploy their 
knowledge, skills and experience 
to enhance value-creation through 
doing new things but without any 
clear offer or expectation that any 
new value thus created will be 
shared with them (Beirne 2013). 
Rather, workers’ co-operation with 
innovative practice and willingness 
to drive innovation – or any 
value-added labour – is taken 
for granted, and insofar as there 
is any real acknowledgement 
of a return for labour, it is in a 
reduction of job insecurity rather 
than an increase in their value-
capture. 
Management calls for greater 
employee engagement, 
co-operation with high-
performance work systems and 
workplace innovation co-exist 
with significant job and job 
status insecurity, increasing work 
intensification and performance 
demands (Gallie et al 2017) – all of 
which attempt to enmesh labour 
more proactively in value-creation 
but with little on offer in terms 
of sharing in the benefits these 
deliver. On the contrary, labour’s 
share of the functional distribution 
of income in advanced economies 
has been on a downward trajectory 
since the 1990s, significantly 
lagging improvements in 
productivity (ILO and OECD 2015). 
The potential of stakeholder 
perspectives
Stakeholder theories have opened 
up an alternative way of thinking 
about value in organisations that 
addresses the issue of who shares 
in value-capture as well as value-
creation and, as we will discuss 
further in Section 4 below, in 
certain types of organisation, the 
central concepts and objectives 
of stakeholder theory are well 
recognised. Yet to date, they 
remain an undeveloped resource to 
challenge the dominance of MSV 
perspectives. In the context of the 
increasingly evident and negative 
outcomes of business models 
in which MSV predominates, 
however, further attention is 
required as to how to account 
for and embed stakeholder 
perspectives, particularly in 
relation to the contribution 
of, interests of and returns to 
workers. One possible way of 
highlighting broader stakeholder 
interests and contribution is 
through accounting practices. 
For this reason in the section 
following we review developments 
in accounting practice that 
attempt to incorporate alternative 
approaches to defining, measuring 
and reporting value. 
Recasting the nature and 
reporting of value in accounting 
and finance
There have been some interesting 
initiatives (set out in detail in 
Part 2) by various professional 
accounting bodies and professional 
service firms, the IIRC2 and others, 
to promote the use of a richer 
set of accounting information 
relating to business models, capital 
inputs and value outputs, through 
integrated reports, balanced 
scorecards and so on. These 
initiatives attempt to recognise a 
broader group of stakeholders in 
the annual reports of companies 
and, on the surface at least, appear 
to be slightly at odds with the 
shareholder value maximisation 
approach. 
When considering profit as an 
output measure, it is important 
to remember that accounting is 
an ‘art, not a science’. It requires 
judgement and relies upon a 
vast array of constantly changing 
rules, standards and other forms 
of regulation. Moreover, there is 
a complex relationship between 
a company’s profit and its share 
price. In theory, share prices are 
more influenced by the prospect 
2  The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) is a global coalition of regulators, investors, companies, standard-setters, the accounting profession 
and NGOs. The coalition is promoting communication about value-creation as the next step in the evolution of corporate reporting.  
(https://integratedreporting.org/the-iirc-2/) [Accessed 29 August, 2017].
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of future profits than current ones, 
and so a company’s share price 
might be quite high, even following 
several years of losses, if investors 
think that it will be profitable in 
the future. This raises an important 
question – how do investors decide 
that company A’s future profits will 
be higher than company B’s? Most 
empirical academic research which 
is interested in this arena has 
assumed that markets are ‘efficient’ 
and part of this efficiency is that 
all publicly available information is 
included in the share price, almost 
instantaneously. So, from a market 
perspective, do investors believe 
that ‘superior’ human/intellectual 
capital or company investments in 
their staff will enable companies to 
earn greater profits? If so, is there 
a case from an investor perspective 
to provide better (regulated?) 
information about human and 
intellectual capital? 
Some academic studies suggest 
that fair and representative 
treatment of HC is important 
to investors (McKnight et al 
2002, Maertz et al 2010). Hillier 
and colleagues (2007) suggest 
that when companies consider 
downsizing, they should look for 
alternatives outside of employee 
streamlining as this is viewed 
negatively by the market, perhaps 
because survivors of lay-offs have 
lower perceived organisational 
performance, lower job security 
and a lower attachment to their 
organisation compared with 
‘no lay-off’ firms (Maertz et al 
2010). Moreover, as Hillier and 
colleagues (2007) noted, and 
Cascio and colleagues (1997) found 
empirically, neither employee 
downsizers nor combined 
downsizers (who reduce employee 
and capital expenditure) realise 
any return on asset (ROA) 
improvements comparative with 
their own industry or stable-
employee industries. However, 
a recent CIPD (2017b) report 
assessed published peer-reviewed 
literature and found that while 
analysts do have access to some 
human capital information, and 
sometimes use it, it is often used 
to a very limited extent compared 
with other types of intangibles. 
In addition, the report found that 
mainstream and environmental 
and social governance analysts 
focused on a narrow range 
of human capital aspects (for 
example management quality) as 
well as human capital data with 
cost implications (for example 
workforce size).
Overall, it appears that the 
small body of empirical finance 
research suggests that the 
market will react to significant 
announcements regarding 
employees, not least because of 
the impact that employees have 
on profits. However, this still 
raises the question as to whether 
shareholders need any additional 
information to that which is 
already available. The academic 
accounting literature has begun 
to acknowledge the importance 
of IC and HC mainly based on 
the concern that accounting has 
failed to change to meet the 
needs of the ‘new economy’ which 
is animated by information and 
knowledge. But while much of the 
mainstream academic literature 
presents normative arguments in 
support of IC/HC reporting, there 
is a dearth of research which 
empirically studies the practice 
of IC/HC reporting (Dumay et al 
2016).
A significant proportion of the 
critically informed academic 
literature is understandably 
suspicious of any form of IC or HC 
reporting. For example, Roslender 
and colleagues (2015), while 
supportive of HC and IC reporting 
initiatives, found that there is 
little in the history of accounting 
theory and practice that has 
‘A significant 
proportion of the 
critically informed 
academic literature 
is understandably 
suspicious of any 
form of IC or HC 
reporting.’
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served the interests of labour 
well. Other work discusses the 
ethical and moral dimensions of 
accounting for people (see McPhail 
2009). Whatever the rights and 
wrongs of accounting for human 
beings, the transition from ‘profit 
maximisation’ to ‘shareholder value 
maximisation’ has produced a 
change in the relative hierarchy of 
the financial reports of companies. 
Whereas the income statement 
(profit and loss account) used to 
be the primary financial statement, 
the change in the purpose of 
companies has proved to be the 
slippery slope to what Power 
(2010) describes as a balance 
sheet (statement of affairs) 
approach to accounting in which 
the balance sheet components 
have to become meaningful rather 
than residual values. Thus, there 
is an emerging stream of research 
which compares the ‘book value’ 
(the total of the assets less the 
liabilities in the balance sheet) with 
the market value of the company, 
which suggests that part of the 
difference must be attributable 
to intellectual and human assets. 
This research aligns with the 
finance literature in its belief that 
analysts and investors will seek 
out information on the IC/HC of 
a business in the hope that it will 
enable more accurate future profits 
forecasts and has found that there 
is a relationship between IC/HC 
reporting/news and share prices 
(Lin et al 2015). The rather narrow 
investor focus of much of the 
mainstream academic literature 
reflects a narrow understanding of 
corporate accountability. We next 
discuss a government initiative 
from the early 2000s which 
sought to increase the information 
in corporate reports, through more 
‘narrative’ reporting. 
Legislation on ‘narrative’ reporting 
— the operating and financial 
review (OFR)
The most likely place in annual 
reports for ‘human accounting’ 
would be in the ‘narrative 
section’ of the annual report. 
An unaudited narrative report 
called the ‘operating and financial 
review’ (OFR) which had featured 
in company reports since the 
early 1990s became the centre 
of government manoeuvres in 
the early 2000s to broaden 
the information base of annual 
reports to include information 
on and for employees. This 
was in line with the Labour 
Government’s official policy to 
increase corporate accountability. 
One way to achieve this would 
be to have a compulsory and 
audited OFR which would contain 
information on the wider social 
and environmental impacts of 
corporate activities.
Contemporaneous with the Labour 
initiative, in 2003 the EU issued its 
‘Accounts Modernisation Directive’, 
which was, in part, designed to 
bring about consistency across 
member states in the level of 
narrative reporting in the annual 
report. It required a mandatory 
addition to the directors’ report 
providing an enhanced review 
of a company’s business. It 
broadly stated that the annual 
report should include information 
relating to environmental and 
employee matters in the context 
of understanding the company’s 
development, performance or 
position. More promisingly, in the 
UK in January 2003, a task force 
on human capital management 
(the Accounting for People Task 
Force) was established by the 
Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry. The task force report 
was strongly supportive of greater 
transparency on how value is 
created through effective people 
policies and practices, and listed 
an array of stakeholders with an 
interest in such transparency. The 
task force recognised that the OFR 
section of the annual report was 
the appropriate place for this. 
In 2004, the Labour Government 
consulted on implementing a new 
statutory OFR in light of the EU 
Accounts Modernisation Directive. 
Following powerful lobbying by 
business, the key tenets of the 
proposed OFR were attenuated to 
a narrow focus on investors rather 
than broad-ranging stakeholder 
groups. The final OFR regulations 
became law in March 2005. The 
Government gave the Accounting 
Standards Board statutory power 
to make a reporting standard in 
this area, which was duly issued 
in May 2005. The standard’s 
implementation guidance sets out 
several pages on such matters as 
employee morale and health and 
safety. 
To the surprise of many, in 
November 2005 Gordon Brown 
(the then Chancellor) announced 
that the Government would not 
go ahead with plans to require 
companies to produce an OFR. 
The statutory underpinning of 
the reporting standard was thus 
removed – it was changed into 
a statement of best practice.3 
Overall, for a few months in 
2005, there was Labour backing 
for more comprehensive and 
innovative ‘accounting for 
people’ in the annual reports 
of companies. Rowbottom and 
Schroeder (2014) argue that 
the withdrawal by Brown was 
3  In light of EU regulation, the requirement to produce a less ‘onerous’ business review remained. More recently, the operating and financial review has been 
replaced by the Financial Reporting Council’s Guidance on the Strategic Report (June 2014). This guidance document, which applies to large companies, 
sets out that disclosures about the environment, employees, social, community and human rights issues are required when material. There is also a 
requirement to include disclosures on gender diversity.
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driven by (misplaced) political 
opportunism. The withdrawal was 
specifically designed to curry 
favour with big business on the 
grounds that Brown and the 
Treasury would not wish to impose 
unnecessary regulatory burdens 
on UK companies. This manoeuvre 
received a mixed reaction. 
The accounting industry saw a 
potentially lucrative new form of 
audit business disappear, while the 
stock exchange was relieved that 
it would not lose the business of 
companies delisting (or moving 
to less onerous exchanges) in the 
face of increased regulation. In any 
case, the vast lobbying before the 
OFR legislation was passed had 
ensured that the OFR maintained a 
shareholder focus, did not increase 
director liability, nor significantly 
extend corporate accountability 
(Rowbottom and Schroeder 2014). 
The rise and rapid demise of the 
OFR highlights the very complex 
institutional structures which would 
have to be overcome in order to 
shift accounting’s focus away from 
a preoccupation with investors 
and creditors and shareholder 
value maximisation. It was 
interesting that the Government 
gave statutory power to the 
Accounting Standards Board to 
make a reporting standard on the 
OFR. This serves to highlight the 
importance of the highly influential 
accounting profession.
The accounting profession and 
accounting regulation 
Initiatives in enhanced reporting 
have taken place within an 
institutional setting that is 
dominated by a powerful and 
coherent accounting industry 
that has a well-founded hierarchy, 
regulatory structure and 
quantitative method (Cooper 
and Senkl 2016). The dominant 
accounting regulatory body 
(accounting standard-setter) is the 
IFRS. IFRS standards are set by the 
IFRS Foundation’s standard-setting 
body, the International Accounting 
Standards Board. The dominant 
funders of the International 
Accounting Standards Board 
are the four largest professional 
accounting services firms.4 The key 
staff of these professional services 
firms are mainly members of one 
(or more) accounting professional 
bodies (ICAEW, ICAS, and so on) 
from which they gain esteem and 
legitimacy. 
Arguably, the accounting industry, 
has ‘enclosed’ the production of 
accounting information (Chabrak 
et al 2017). Companies in 138 
countries are either required by 
their governments, or permitted, 
to follow IFRS standards. 
Accordingly, there are a host of 
institutions with different interests 
who would like to be able to 
influence accounting regulation. 
National accounting standard-
setting bodies can set national 
rules. For example, since 2010, 
the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, which is mandatory for 
listed companies under stock 
exchange rules, requires directors 
to include an explanation of their 
business model in the annual 
report which highlights how a 
company uses different forms of 
capital – financial, intellectual, 
human, environmental and so 
on – to create value (Financial 
Reporting Council 2016).5 However, 
international accounting rule-
setting is the domain of the IFRS, 
and audited company financial 
reports, which have been compiled 
according to the requirements of 
‘The rise and 
rapid demise of 
the OFR highlights 
the very complex 
institutional 
structures which 
would have to be 
overcome in order 
to shift accounting’s 
focus away from 
a preoccupation 
with investors 
and creditors and 
shareholder value 
maximisation.’
4  PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Ernst & Young (EY), Deloitte, and KPMG.
5  And since 2013, the UK Strategic Report Regulations require the disclosure of business models by quoted companies.
20   Value at work: who benefits?  Part 1 – Thematic literature review 21   Value at work: who benefits?  Part 1 – Thematic literature review
international accounting standards, 
are deemed to be ‘legitimate’ and 
‘trustworthy’ by the international 
investment community.
In terms of the views of accounting 
regulators on IC (Accounting 
Principles Board 1970, Accounting 
Standards Board 1997, International 
Accounting Standards Committee 
1998), they have typically lumped 
IC together with other intangible 
assets (such as reputation) 
(see Pew Tan et al 2007). The 
current accounting standard on 
intangibles, IAS 38, is extremely 
conservative regarding the 
intangibles which it will allow 
into the accounts of companies. 
The International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) justifies 
the dearth of regulation on human 
capital reporting by suggesting 
that ‘intangibles’ (like human 
beings) are already reflected in the 
financial results of a business (one 
would imagine through the income 
statement). 
From an accounting perspective, 
initiatives such as Integrated 
Reporting or the inclusion of 
business models in annual reports 
are seen, by some, as options for 
culling the ‘narrative’ parts of annual 
reports. It has been argued (Beattie 
and Smith 2013) that a clearer 
elucidation of a company’s business 
model will enable it to eliminate all of 
the narrative elements in their annual 
report which are not concerned with 
the company’s business model, and 
so unnecessary. A recent Financial 
Reporting Council (2016) report on 
corporate business model reporting 
suggests that accounts should 
include employee numbers and cost 
disclosure and an explanation of 
how human resources are employed 
according to the business model. In 
terms of value-creation, the report 
suggests that it is important to 
disclose how a company generates 
economic value, what are the key 
revenue and profit drivers and 
how they are monetised. It further 
suggests including information on 
any key assets and liabilities that 
support value-generation and how 
they are maintained or enhanced. 
Within this, it would be possible to 
report on employees’ input into the 
value-creation process. But, there 
is no specific concern with the way 
in which employees create value. 
Importantly, information relating 
to the employees of a company is 
typically seen by the accounting 
industry as supplementary to 
traditional forms of financial reporting. 
For our purposes, there are two 
important beliefs which underpin 
the work of the IFRS (as well 
as professional service firms, 
professional accounting bodies 
and national accounting standard-
setters). The first concerns the 
groups for whom accounting 
information is prepared. These are 
elucidated in the IFRS Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting, 
which makes clear that the 
objective of financial reporting is to 
provide financial information about 
the reporting entity that is useful 
to existing and potential investors, 
lenders and other creditors in 
making decisions about providing 
resources to the entity.6 Thus, 
according to the IFRS, financial 
reporting is only concerned with 
a narrow set of stakeholders (in 
effect, shareholders and creditors). 
The UK’s own Financial Reporting 
Council takes a similar approach. In 
its 2016 report on business model 
reporting (Financial Reporting 
Council 2016),7 it lists (p5) a 
very narrow set of stakeholders 
comprising companies, investors 
and advisers. 
The second belief is that the 
dominant output of a business  
is shareholder or financial 
value. This was made clear in a 
speech on 26 April 2017 by Hans 
Hoogervorst, Chairman of the 
IASB, in which he set out the 
current approach of the IASB 
(the Board) to wider corporate 
reporting (for example Integrated 
Reporting). He stated that what 
he was saying was ‘tentative’, but 
then went on to say:
Let me start out by saying that the 
Board is not concerned that the 
relevance of financial reporting 
is under threat. First, because 
financial reporting is primarily 
– but certainly not exclusively 
– backward looking, it offers 
the most tangible evidence of 
a company’s performance. The 
income statement will remain the 
‘hardest’ and most comparable 
source of information for investors. 
Second, in the course of time, all 
value-creation – also the focus 
of integrated reporting – will 
ultimately pass through the 
financial statements, although 
often with a considerable time lag. 
For these reasons, the financial 
statements will most likely remain 
the main anchor for investors and 
creditors in evaluating a company’s 
performance. (IFRS 2017, p1)
In short, the dominant position 
taken by the accounting industry 
is that value-creation is ultimately 
financial value-creation. Any 
initiative which sets out to bring 
about changes to financial 
reporting, for example social 
accounting or intellectual capital 
accounting, without the backing 
of, and inclusion into, IFRS 
standards, will, at best, remain 
a secondary, less important 
information source. 
6 www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/conceptual-framework/ [Accessed 27 August, 2017].
7  FRC. (2016) Business model reporting. Available at: www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Financial-Reporting-Lab/FRC-Lab-Business-model-disclosure.pdf 
[Accessed 27 August, 2017].
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3  Value-creation and capture – the need 
for an integrated approach
The preceding discussion of the 
distinct and separate literatures 
around value highlights the need 
for an integrated debate about 
how value is created and captured, 
and the relationship between these 
distinct yet connected processes. 
Value-capture has implications for 
value-creation, and both need to 
be understood in relation to the 
other. While the pervasiveness 
of the MSV model, strengthened 
by processes of financialisation, 
has characterised recent decades 
in many advanced economies, 
this model speaks only to value-
capture, and is silent and arguably 
neutral on value-creation. Yet 
MSV has massive impact on 
value-creation and the business 
models that support creating 
value for shareholders. Put simply, 
shareholder value pressures lead 
to the development of business 
models based on meso- and 
micro-level accounting techniques 
and management practices that 
transfer economic risk to labour 
(Allen and Henry 1997), increase 
insecurity (Kalleberg 2009), reduce 
labour’s share of value-capture 
(Karabarbounis and Neiman 2013) 
and exert excessive pressure on 
supply chains (Gearhart 2016). 
While both human capital and 
HRM approaches speak directly 
to the creation of value, both 
say little about how value, once 
created, is distributed and to 
whom. Despite the growing 
concern over dysfunctions 
associated with some business 
models that support MSV, focusing 
only on value-creation means that 
HR professionals have little to 
say about these emergent cracks 
in such models. Thus, while the 
HR community brings important 
insights into any debate on value-
creation, viewing value through a 
wider lens is necessary to enhance 
the HR profession’s ability to 
influence the entire value process. 
While we have focused on 
the predominant MSV model, 
businesses exhibit a range of 
approaches to value, and it is 
important to learn from alternative 
approaches that are oriented 
towards a wider stakeholder group. 
Employers make (constrained) 
choices in implicit/explicit decision-
making related to their business 
model and thus how they define 
their value proposition. While these 
choices are constrained by socio-
institutional/macro factors, they 
have implications for how value 
is defined, created, and captured, 
the ways in which human, social 
and intellectual capital is attracted, 
developed and maintained as part 
of businesses’ value propositions, 
and who shares in value-capture.
Stakeholder theories have 
developed, but not resolved, 
the challenge of who shares 
in the distribution of value. 
Alongside social accounting 
approaches, stakeholder theories 
rightly acknowledge the social 
embeddedness of business and 
the claim of stakeholders to 
have a say in what businesses 
do and a share in what they 
create. Yet stakeholders are often 
broadly and loosely defined and 
the mechanisms by which their 
interests are represented within 
businesses, as well as the extent to 
which they wield influence, is often 
underspecified. 
‘Stakeholder 
theories have 
developed, but 
not resolved, the 
challenge of who 
shares in the 
distribution of 
value.’ 
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Part of the lacunae that this 
creates might be addressed by 
a greater focus on proximate 
stakeholders, and labour in 
particular, in value-creation and 
capture. There is broad agreement 
that labour plays a crucial role 
in value-creation and there is 
increasing recognition of the 
innovative potential and economic 
value of investing in and deploying 
human, social and intellectual 
capital. Some of this debate has 
emerged in discussions of the 
individual, organisational, economic 
and social benefits of high-quality 
jobs that should better support 
high-value business activities 
(Findlay et al 2017). Yet as any 
consideration of the evidence on 
high-performance work systems 
makes clear (Jensen et al 2013), 
labour’s role in enhancing value-
creation, particularly in relation 
to discretionary activity, is 
underpinned by labour’s share in 
value-capture (Findlay et al 2016a). 
This latter point has been central 
to research on mutual gains 
employment relationships which 
combine attention to improving 
value-creation with a greater right 
to, and share of, value-capture for 
labour. Kochan and Osterman’s 
(1994) The Mutual Gains Enterprise 
proposed that firms can address 
how the workforce is managed in 
ways that generate competitive 
advantage and deliver gains 
(value) to multiple stakeholders, 
thus ‘expanding the proverbial 
“pie”’ to create ‘the conditions for a 
“win-win” employment relationship’ 
(Avgar and Owens 2014) where 
workers benefit materially 
and in particular in enhanced 
employment security (Appelbaum 
and Batt 1993). There are strong 
parallels between some analyses 
of mutual gains employment 
relationships, often built around 
employer–employee partnership 
arrangements, and instrumental 
stakeholder theory. 
The evidence, however, on the 
outputs and outcomes of mutual 
gains approaches in businesses 
is somewhat mixed (Glover et 
al 2014, Whyman and Petrescu 
2014). It is unsurprising, given our 
earlier discussion, that voluntarist 
approaches to sharing value 
gains are enormously sensitive 
to inequalities of labour market 
power as well as to occupational, 
firm, sectoral and national context. 
In the UK and Irish contexts, 
the many critics of what are 
supposed to be mutual gains 
employer–employee partnerships 
point to limited substantive gains 
made by workers through such 
arrangements in the context 
of declining trade union power 
and limited institutional support 
(Kelly 2004, Roche and Teague 
2014). As Bélanger and Edwards 
(2007) note, while sustainable 
mutual gains arrangements require 
supporting conditions that are 
relatively rare, such arrangements 
are more likely, and more likely to 
be successful, where ‘beneficial 
constraints’ exist, such as state 
intervention to contain some 
market pressures, or where 
particular market conditions or 
employer orientations support 
mutual gains arrangements. 
As such, ‘… the balance of 
mutuality and the conditions 
supporting workplace compromise 
warrants analytical and empirical 
examination’ (Dobbins and 
Gunnigle 2009, p546) in a specific 
context. At workplace level, Budd 
(2004) argues that building 
effective collaborative relationships 
requires balancing value-creation, 
realisation and capture by paying 
attention to the relative emphasis 
on efficiency, equity and voice, 
rather than adopting extreme and 
potentially untenable positions. 
However, there is a need to 
move beyond the ‘business-case 
“productive factor” approach’ 
(Wilkinson et al 2014, p740) to 
building stakeholder recognition 
and collaboration within 
businesses, as currently favoured 
by the EU. It also means moving 
beyond a single-level focus on 
the organisational level towards 
identifying and measuring the 
full direct and indirect costs and 
benefits of business models for 
individuals, businesses and society 
(Findlay et al 2016a). Maximising 
shareholder value, in ignoring such 
externalities, obscures important 
costs imposed in the value process 
that are not borne by businesses 
and by the shareholders that 
capture value. 
We will return to the potential 
for institutional interventions 
to influence value-creation and 
capture in Part 2. In the following 
section, we look at how business 
models reflect distinctive value 
propositions driven by the 
existence of ‘beneficial constraints’ 
or alternatively ‘detrimental 
enablers’ alongside the scope for 
employer choice. 
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4  Business models and choice in 
value propositions
The extant literature on business 
models and value-creation 
suggest that organisational 
(and managerial) strategic 
choices are central to how the 
organisation defines and seeks 
to create value (Teece 2010). 
As a theoretical construct, 
the business model has been 
largely absent from accounting, 
economics and business studies 
(Shafer et al 2005, Casadesus-
Masanell and Ricart 2010, Teece 
2010). Notwithstanding a lack of 
definitional agreement, business 
models encompass interconnected 
value processes and networks that 
reflect the key business choices 
made by firms. Simply put, the 
business model can be defined 
as ‘the logic of the firm, the way it 
operates and how it creates value 
for its stakeholders’ (Casadesus-
Masanell and Ricart 2010, p197).
The concept of business models 
as distinctive strategies, practices 
and narratives to create value for 
stakeholders can be applied at 
firm, sector or (less convincingly) 
national levels. There is little 
consensus on the composition of 
business models. On the one hand, 
there are references to choices 
and consequences (Casadesus-
Masanell and Ricart 2010) and, 
we would add, contexts. On the 
other hand, there are references 
to concrete practices, such as cost 
structures, pricing, capitalisation 
and cash generation (Andersson 
et al 2014). The primary purpose 
of any business model is to 
identify how to use firm resources 
more productively to create and 
capture value or, put another way, 
to enhance surplus generating 
capacity. Conventional wisdom, 
particularly in the HR field (see 
for example CIPD 2017a, 2017c), 
holds that a combination of 
organisational or ‘people-related’ 
capitals (including human, 
intellectual, social and financial 
capitals) create layers of firm value, 
though not without ‘structural 
capital’ or the ‘supportive 
infrastructure, processes and 
databases that enable human and 
social capital to function’ (Ordóñez 
de Pablos and Tennyson 2013). 
However, business models are 
not closed, consensual or even 
necessarily coherent systems. 
Corporate strategies are, in 
part, concerned with different 
configurations of value-creation 
and capture (or extraction) and 
these typically exhibit a bias in 
governance, distribution and other 
processes towards particular 
stakeholders (such as shareholders, 
suppliers, workers, customers). 
For example, as Lazonick and 
Mazzucato (2013) argue, in many 
large private organisations there 
is a tension in the risk–reward 
nexus between the human capital 
(effort and embedded skills 
and knowledge) expended in 
value-creation and how value 
is extracted. Sustainable value-
creation tends to be collective and 
cumulative, but may be under-
recognised and undervalued in 
the market when more powerful 
economic actors use allocation 
processes in product or financial 
markets to extract disproportionate 
value, often in short-term and 
speculative ways. One example of 
this is the way in which the cost 
competition strategies of powerful 
supermarkets impacts on suppliers 
and their workers through 
‘The primary 
purpose of any 
business model is 
to identify how to 
use firm resources 
more productively 
to create and 
capture value 
or, put another 
way, to enhance 
surplus generating 
capacity.’ 
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‘opportunistic dealing adopted 
by the supermarkets in vertically 
disintegrated supply chains, where 
all actors attempt to pass the risks 
and costs onto somebody else’ 
(Bowman et al 2013, p300) to such 
an extent that production (in this 
case, of meat products) becomes, 
according to these authors, almost 
unviable. That is not inevitable, but 
rather one outcome as rival power 
resources are brought to bear 
through stakeholder interactions 
and adaptations, leading to 
business models as dynamic 
and contested processes. In this 
section, we draw attention to some 
of the strategic choices around 
work and value that underlie 
business models. 
This is not a fully developed 
typology, but it does identify some 
of the range of practices across 
different sectors, focusing only on 
privately owned businesses. Value 
is, of course, created in other types 
of organisation – for example, use 
values are created in the public 
sector – and we acknowledge that 
many of the business models and 
management approaches that 
stem from MSV in businesses are 
also learned and adopted in public 
and third sector organisations. But 
value-creation in private businesses 
is fundamentally different in 
character and a ‘…simultaneous 
discussion of a variety of possible 
stakeholder relationships leads, in 
our view, to confusion rather than 
clarification. The critical corporate 
stakeholder issues, both in theory 
and in practice, involve evidentiary 
considerations and conceptual 
issues (for example, the meaning 
of property rights) unique to the 
corporate setting’ (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995, p69). With this in 
mind, we consider the globalised 
non-financial corporation, 
knowledge-intensive firms, gig/
digital businesses, privately owned 
(that is, non-listed) firms and 
employee-owned enterprises. 
While these business models differ 
significantly, Section 6 shows that 
tensions exist between value-
creation and capture in every type 
of firm and that there are decisions 
regarding trade-offs between 
the two to be made in all firm 
circumstances. 
The globalised non-financial 
corporation
Given the size and diversity of 
privately listed firms, a search for 
a distinctive business model would 
be fruitless. We can, however, note 
three overlapping medium-term 
trends amongst large international 
players.
Concentration: In the 1990s and 
into the new century, there was 
a marked acceleration of the 
trend towards concentration and 
centralisation of capital (Nolan 
and Zhang 2003, Foster and 
McChesney 2012). Though Nolan 
and Zhang (2003) focused on 
firm-level concentration on a 
global scale across the value 
chain in many traditional industry 
sectors, such as aerospace, 
automobiles and banking, it is 
equally true of the newer creative 
industries (Fitzgerald 2015) and 
internet corporations (Fuchs 2013). 
The building blocks of the business 
model are the development of 
integrated logistics and distribution 
networks that allow central 
co-ordination, increased market 
share (often through merger and 
acquisition), building the power 
of global brands through huge 
advertising budgets, and using 
that market leverage to exercise 
tight controls upstream and 
downstream across the chain, 
establishing high switching costs 
for suppliers. To the extent that 
such models include knowledge-
intensive R&D amongst core, 
home-nation technical-professional 
workers, value-creation through 
human capital plays a central role 
(Mahutga 2014). However, as will 
be seen below, we have to look at 
the whole model and chain. 
Globalisation of value chains: 
Central to the dominant business 
model has been the strengthening 
of lead firm governance in the 
value chain. Milberg (2008) 
argues that in conditions where 
intensified competition makes 
it harder for lead firms to make 
profits through raising prices in 
product markets, and when they 
are less willing to invest in human 
and technical capital to raise 
productivity, lowering input prices 
thus becomes the main thrust of 
the dominant business model. 
Two pathways are particularly 
prominent. Lead firms ‘slice up’ 
the chain through offshoring, 
arm’s-length subcontracting and 
other arrangements (Milberg 
2008, p424). They also seek 
to squeeze and shift risks and 
costs onto suppliers. Centralised 
procurement is a core mechanism 
of this, with formal, metric-based 
calculations driving standards and 
evaluation processes rather than 
longer-term relationship-building, 
as illustrated, for example, in retail 
(Baud and Durand 2012) and 
mining (Parker et al 2017). Though 
other components of the business 
model may differ, the activities of 
Apple (Haslam et al 2013, Lehman 
and Haslam 2013, Froud et al 2014) 
and Walmart (Gereffi and Christian 
2009, Lichtenstein 2011) reveal a 
reliance on low pricing and global 
sourcing, with an emphasis on 
value-capture and cost controls in 
the supply chain that adversely hit 
labour’s share of value-added and 
human capital formation amongst 
suppliers and subcontractors. 
Financialisation: We covered 
the general characteristics of 
financialisation earlier (see 
Section 2 above), so there is no 
need for repetition. The point to 
emphasise here is that most of 
the above studies of the value 
chain provide evidence that 
financialisation is a key driver of 
both concentration and global 
sourcing strategies. Shareholder 
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value pressures heavily weight 
business models in the direction 
of cash returns and disbursement, 
boosting market values of stock 
and the development of new 
revenue streams in part through 
financial engineering. In turn, this 
stimulates incentives for cost-
reducing, flexibility-enhancing 
offshore production (Milberg 
2008, p421) and value-based 
control mechanisms (Cushen and 
Thompson 2012, Parker et al 2017). 
In contrast, a business model 
bias towards value-extraction 
deters long-term investment 
and innovation, particularly in 
organisational capitals (Orhangazi 
2008, Stockhammer 2008, 
Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013). 
Knowledge-intensive firms
Though claims that knowledge is 
the driving force for contemporary 
economies have been over-stated 
(Thompson and Harley 2012), 
knowledge-intensive industries are 
at the centre of national innovation 
systems. Wider stakeholder 
investment in the life sciences 
knowledge base by the state – 
such as incentives for knowledge 
transfer from universities and 
start-up SMEs through the UK 
Catapult programmes – is also 
typical of such sectors (Kerry and 
Danson 2016). Given the extensive 
cycle of product development 
from discovery to market, firms in 
sectors such as biopharmaceuticals 
have traditionally been regarded 
as operating a science-based 
business model with strong, long-
term investment in R&D and other 
knowledge-based assets, and 
with a dependency on the role 
of intellectual capital in product 
and process (Froud et al 2006, 
Andersson et al 2010). It has been 
argued that much of the thrust of 
the development of knowledge 
management initiatives and tools 
have been driven by initiatives in 
biopharma and similar industries, 
as management search for ways 
of widening the value-creation 
net through more systematic 
and productive access to the 
tacit knowledge of expert labour 
(McKinlay 2002, 2005).
However, knowledge-intensive 
industries are not immune to 
the broader trends described 
above. There is now a persuasive 
body of evidence indicating a 
partial financialisation of the 
traditional business model (Froud 
et al 2006, Lazonick et al 2007, 
Andersson et al 2010, Montalban 
and Sakinç 2013, Gleadle et al 
2014). Cost pressures mean that 
companies are finding it harder 
to finance research-based drug 
discovery through high returns 
on investment. As a result, 
there has been a shift away 
from a productionist model to 
one in which there is increased 
dependence on the capital 
market to fund the risks over the 
development cycle. Financialisation 
in pharmaceutical and biotech 
companies occurs where: 
The main objective of financial 
investors, to generate a higher 
and less risky return on equity and 
debt, gains in importance over – 
and moves out of line with – the 
concerns of employees, customers, 
suppliers and others directly 
involved in the flow of material and 
human (as distinct from capital) 
resources. (Gleadle et al 2014, p68)
The length of the cycle and 
the pipeline allows investors 
to exert pressure at various 
‘milestone’ points to ensure 
that R&D increasingly pays for 
itself in the here and now and 
when new blockbuster drugs are 
not on the immediate horizon 
(as has increasingly been the 
case). Such trends have been 
noted in the recent report to the 
Government of the Life Sciences 
Industry Strategy Board (2017). 
They refer to the ‘misalignment’ 
of the available types of risk 
capital and the relative absence 
‘Cost pressures 
mean that 
companies are 
finding it harder to 
finance research-
based drug 
discovery through 
high returns on 
investment.’ 
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of ‘patient capital’ compared 
with the realities of long-term 
drug discovery and development. 
While such developments do not 
remove or marginalise human 
capital inputs, the speed-up 
of discovery to market does 
subject expert labour to greater 
pressures for standardisation, work 
intensification and constraints 
on autonomy (McKinlay 2002, 
2005). One other change in the 
industry ecosystem is worth 
noting. The high returns available 
from high-tech start-ups make 
biopharma SMEs attractive 
locations for intervention by 
venture capitalists and IPOs 
that take mutually or privately 
owned firms to the market. Such 
developments capitalise value 
generated collectively by economic 
actors and are accompanied by a 
narrative that associates risk-taking 
with new investors, neglecting 
the role played by the state and 
other stakeholders (Lazonick and 
Mazzucato 2013).
The (digital) gig economy
The term gig economy is 
ubiquitous in UK public discourse, 
with recent debate focusing on 
Matthew Taylors’s report for the 
Government (Taylor et al 2017), 
with its recommendation of 
new legal rights for ‘dependent 
contractors’. Though contentious, 
the dependency terminology is a 
step back from widespread claims 
in business literatures associating 
‘gigs’ with a networked digital 
economy defined by the dominance 
of freelancing, contracting and 
so-called ‘entreployees’. This is 
represented as the growth of an 
independent workforce, located 
in a business model defined by 
the matching of flexibility- and 
autonomy-seeking workers, and 
value-conscious consumers looking 
for new personal and professional 
services. In this picture, both firm 
and workplace disappear, or at 
least diminish in significance, as 
‘collaborative and peer-based forms 
of labour organisation … shape 
lives independent of dominant 
institutional forms’ (Cefkin et al 
2014, p4).
Commentaries on the gig economy 
tend to focus on casualisation in 
the labour market, notably zero-
hours contracts. While relevant, 
often the net is cast widely to 
any form of ‘gig’ and without 
investigating the underlying 
business model and labour 
process. Temporary forms of 
labour have long been associated 
with industries such as film, 
which run largely on the basis of 
recurrent projects (Blair 2001). 
In this section, we are concerned 
solely with the distinctive, 
relatively new on-demand, online 
digital labour platforms (see 
Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft 
2013, Graham et al 2017, Grandini 
2017). The platform business 
model offers a two-fold process of 
re-intermediation – of the meeting 
of supply and demand of work, 
and of the workers’ revenue stream 
– that re-territorialises capital–
labour relations in a context 
characterised by geographically 
dispersed, formally ‘freelance’ 
employment that functions as a 
form of ‘internalised offshoring’ 
(Silverman 2014). Online does not 
mean unanchored in a material 
context and value is still created 
in a virtual, digitised point of 
production. 
It is difficult to estimate accurately 
how many workers are involved 
in such platforms as there are 
significant differences between 
the numbers registered and 
those considered to be active 
(Findlay and Thompson 2017). 
Though digital labour platforms 
operate through workers creating 
a profile in order to be available 
for hire, there is a diversity of 
forms. Crowdsourcing involves 
the platform facilitating clients or 
organisations offering open calls 
for bids for work that range from 
high-skill or complex projects 
(Freelancer, Upwork) to low-skill, 
fragmented micro-tasks that 
are re-assembled by the client 
(Mechanical Turk, TaskRabbit). 
Such contest platforms can be 
contrasted to companies such 
as Uber and Deliveroo, who 
themselves define and specify 
product and task. 
Nevertheless, there are broad 
similarities across the business 
models that derive from the 
flow of value through this 
digitised point of production. 
This conversion of labour power 
captures value through the 
cost structure produced by 
the subordination of formally 
independent contract labour. The 
role of the firm and the platform 
is rendered opaque if not invisible 
to the customer, as management 
operates at a distance through 
algorithmic controls that assemble 
feedback, reviews and rankings 
into reputation metrics and 
reputational capital for workers 
(Graham et al 2017, Gandini 2017). 
The platform business model 
facilitates value-capture by firms 
and customers, but is harder 
for workers because of spatial 
dispersion, the lack of transparency 
of algorithmic design and 
information asymmetries. In this 
context ‘dependent contractor’ is a 
conceptual convenience, a sticking 
plaster that is lagging behind 
UK legal rulings that Deliveroo, 
Uber and other workers are fully 
subject to managerial direction 
and discipline (Rosenblat and 
Stark 2016). There are exceptions. 
Participants in crowdsourcing 
platforms for the Global South can 
exercise forms of skills arbitrage 
– in other words, to sell labour to 
parts of the world and in product 
markets where it is normally more 
expensive (Lehdonvirta 2016, p68). 
However, the aggregate effect is 
to diminish labour’s capacity to 
capture a proportionate share of 
value added. 
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Private shareholder firms 
Approaches to maximising 
shareholder value vary according 
to the nature of shareholders 
and their relationship with other 
stakeholders. It is unhelpful to 
think of all businesses operating 
in line with the practices and 
approaches of large corporations, 
not least because the majority 
of businesses are not, and the 
majority of employment is not 
in, large corporations but rather 
in small and medium-sized 
enterprises. A wide range of 
business models operate among 
profit-seeking private ventures and 
it is not possible to refer to them 
all here. For illustrative purposes, 
however, focusing on one firm form 
– family-owned firms – allows us to 
pose business model alternatives 
and to open up a debate on the 
role of patient capital (as distinct 
from ‘impatient’ or ‘activist 
investor’ capital, see Jacobs 2011) 
in business models. 
The literature on family firms has 
long recognised that these firms 
can exhibit distinctive approaches 
to value-creation that are not 
driven by profit maximisation, 
as well as distinct approaches to 
value distribution that do not focus 
solely on maximising shareholder 
value. Three distinctive elements 
that are more prominent in 
family firms are highlighted: the 
pursuit of non-financial goals; the 
engagement of stakeholders other 
than shareholders; and the sharing 
of risk and benefits. 
It is well recognised that non-
financial goals including corporate 
reputation, autonomy and control, 
loyalty and trustful relations, status 
and community goodwill are more 
important to many family firms. 
Some argue that aspirations for 
identity fit between family and 
firm, allied to the visibility of the 
family in the businesses, drive 
non-financial goals (Zellweger 
et al 2013). Family identity 
alignment is also an important 
element of family businesses’ 
orientation towards the creation 
of socio-emotional, as opposed to 
simply economic, wealth through 
creating greater security, nurturing 
contribution and sharing benefits 
(Berrone et al 2012). Creating 
socio-emotional wealth or value 
does not eschew financial or 
economic issues but pursues these 
alongside non-economic objectives 
that are important to the business 
and its stakeholders. 
Cennamo and colleagues (2012) 
draw on family businesses’ 
aspiration to maintain and increase 
socio-emotional wealth as an 
explanation of greater stakeholder 
‘Patient capital’ is long-term investment aimed at generating returns 
from substantial business growth that shields firms from excessive 
concern with short-term market indicators, although what constitutes 
long term varies by sector. Block holding of shares – such as, for 
example, that by the Swedish Wallenberg Foundation or charitable 
trusts – promotes patient capital. 
This is contrasted with ‘impatient’ or ‘activist investor’ capital 
as exemplified by hedge funds that prioritises short-term profit 
maximisation for high returns from lower-risk projects. 
Patient capital is widely viewed as necessary for businesses and 
sectors that require high investment in R&D and to support world-
leading innovation.
‘Creating socio-
emotional wealth 
or value does not 
eschew financial 
or economic issues 
but pursues these 
alongside non-
economic objectives 
that are important 
to the business and 
its stakeholders.’ 
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engagement in family firms. 
Many family owners place greater 
emphasis on, and value, social 
goals and consequently show 
greater sensitivity to stakeholder 
issues and interests. Such proactive 
stakeholder engagement may 
be instrumentally driven, hence 
focusing on those stakeholders with 
a greater influence on firm control 
and survival, but engagement may 
also be normatively driven and 
reflect core values about how the 
family firm should ‘do the right 
thing’ for its various constituencies 
and society. Non-financial goals 
that satisfy non-family stakeholders 
play an important role in enhancing 
organisational and hence family 
reputation (Zellweger et al 2013). 
Stakeholder identification also 
influences strategic priorities in 
small entrepreneurial firms. Wiklund 
and colleagues’ (2003) research on 
small businesses suggests that non-
economic concerns, and concern for 
employee well-being in particular, 
may outweigh potential financial 
outcomes in shaping attitudes 
towards company growth.
Managers who believe that the 
work atmosphere will improve due 
to growth tend to have a positive 
attitude toward growth. Conversely, 
those who expect that growth will 
deteriorate the work atmosphere 
tend to have a negative attitude 
toward growth. (Wiklund et al 
2003, p266)
Concern with reputation, identity 
alignment and socio-emotional 
wealth impact on family firms’ 
decision-making in ways 
that can impact significantly 
on employees. For example, 
Berrone and colleagues (2012) 
argue that concern with socio-
emotional wealth engenders 
different approaches to the 
sharing of risk and benefits, 
particularly in businesses with 
high family involvement, where 
a greater willingness to shoulder 
any costs of uncertainty are an 
acknowledgement that such risks 
are counterbalanced by non-
economic benefits. Zellweger and 
colleagues (2013) argue that family 
businesses pursue non-financial 
objectives that are intended to 
satisfy non-family stakeholders to 
ensure a favourable organisational 
reputation. 
Of course, not all family firms 
create value in the ways described 
above. Chrisman and colleagues 
(2012) argue that the crucial 
intervening variable is family 
essence – an indicator of a 
family’s willingness to use its 
ability to influence firm behaviour 
in a particularistic fashion – so 
highlighting the scope for some 
employer choice in the value 
process. In addition, it is not only 
family businesses that focus on 
non-economic goals. An emphasis 
on creating value for a broader 
group of stakeholders is evident 
in some discussions of responsible 
business and in research on SME 
entrepreneurs (Hammann et al 
2009). These authors explored 
‘the relationship between an SME 
executive’s social responsibility and 
the value-creation of a firm, i.e. 
whether (personal) values create 
(economic) value’ and found that 
by adopting management practices 
consistent with wider social 
responsibilities, firms enhanced 
perceived stakeholder perceptions, 
which in turn positively impacted 
financial performance. Notably, 
these authors highlighted the 
importance of value orientation 
towards employees, concluding 
that ‘values can create additional 
value’ (Hammann et al 2009, p37). 
The literature focuses heavily on 
values or identity alignment as the 
key driver of family firms’ distinctive 
approach to value. Pursuing family 
values in an organisational context 
is only possible, of course, because 
of ownership and corporate 
governance (Carney 2005). We see 
the importance of patient capital 
in large firms and corporations in 
facilitating business models that 
focus on longer-term outcomes 
and the role of a broad stakeholder 
group in delivering these outcomes 
(Jacobs 2011, Lippert et al 2014). 
In family-owned firms, control 
over capital and the scope this 
gives for distinctive governance 
and strategy enables greater 
choice over business models, the 
ability to make decisions without 
recourse to a third party, and 
the ability to eschew maximising 
shareholder value on a short-term 
basis in favour of stewardship 
of the firm for the longer-term 
interests of both the firm and 
the owner family. Nor does this 
orientation harm performance. 
The UBS Report (2015) found 
that family- or founder-owned 
companies have significantly better 
performance than conventional 
public companies. Such stewardship 
emphasises company continuity, 
nurturing a community of 
employees and creating close 
connections with customers (Miller 
et al 2008). This can lead to a 
focus on broader conceptions of 
value rather than wealth-creation 
(Chrisman et al 2012). 
Employee-owned businesses
We have outlined a number of 
alternative business models in 
terms of how these reflect business 
activities, business and labour 
market context, ownership and 
governance. What is clear from 
these examples of business models 
is that, notwithstanding important 
constraints, business models reflect 
choices, and the extent to which 
these choices reflect economic 
and non-economic objectives or 
prioritise shareholder or stakeholder 
(and especially employee/worker) 
interests varies enormously. 
Thinking about employee-owned 
(EO) businesses gives us an 
opportunity to develop further 
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some thoughts about prevalent 
tensions in the value process.
Interest in employee-owned 
businesses has seen a resurgence 
over the last decade, not least 
because there is some evidence 
to suggest that EO businesses 
have weathered better the global 
financial crisis and its ongoing 
impact and that EO businesses 
perform well both economically 
and in terms of workplace relations 
(Kruse 2016). On the face of it, 
one might expect that the tension 
between value-creation and 
value-capture would not exist 
in an employee-owned business 
given that employees are the 
shareholders, both creating value 
and, as owners, benefitting from 
value-capture. One might also 
expect, following from this, that 
the experience of working in 
employee-owned businesses would 
be more favourable for employees.
The reality is, however, somewhat 
more complex, a complexity that 
stems from the tensions between 
value-creation and capture in any 
context. Structural constraints still 
bear heavily on EO businesses – 
raising finance, accessing knowledge 
and staff, ensuring sustainability/
succession, for example. EO 
businesses are heterogeneous, and 
encapsulate a variety of types of 
ownership and forms of governance. 
Having employees as shareholders 
does not remove the agency 
problem – it simply reconfigures it. 
Many, if not most, EO businesses 
rely on professional management 
and the relationship between 
professional management and 
other shareholders may differ little 
from conventionally owned firms. 
Given this, there is no necessary 
connection between employee 
ownership and associated forms 
of governance and the day-to-day 
experience of work in EO firms, 
and concerns over more intensive 
self-exploitation are present in 
the literature. EO firms are not all 
innovative in involving employees 
(Pendleton et al 1998), and have 
been used in the US as vehicles 
to avoid unionisation (Wills and 
Lincoln 1999). Moreover, even in a 
context of employee ownership, 
EO businesses must still balance 
internal and external stakeholder 
interests and aspirations as 
the interests of employees and 
shareholders (including employee 
non-shareholders and shareholding 
ex- or non-employees in some 
businesses) compete with those 
of suppliers, customers and 
society. These tensions between 
stakeholder interests are often 
filled with temporal challenges – 
how much is owed or due to each 
stakeholder group at different 
points in time, a challenge that is 
developed further below. Overall, 
EO businesses are not always 
imbued with alternative values 
that depart from the centrality of 
creating shareholder value and, 
even where they are, these values 
exist in tension with business 
realities in market economies. 
Take John Lewis Partnership (JLP) 
as an example (for an extensive 
recent exposition, see Salaman 
and Storey 2016). JLP operates 
in the highly competitive retail 
market, ‘navigating the dual logics 
of mutualism’ (Salaman and 
Storey 2016, px) and playing out 
‘competing institutional logics’ 
(Salaman and Storey 2016, p16). 
All employees are partners in the 
business, although the business is 
owned collectively, so individual 
employees cannot realise their 
ownership stake. Their stake ends 
when their employment ceases, 
whether through voluntary exit, 
dismissal, redundancy or retirement. 
Professional management play a 
predominant role in the businesses, 
largely unhindered by partnership 
considerations. In formal terms, 
partnership governance holds the 
chairman accountable, who in turn 
‘Having employees as 
shareholders does not 
remove the agency 
problem – it simply 
reconfigures it.’ 
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holds management accountable, yet 
many of the longstanding partnership 
structures that have influenced 
managerial action have arguably 
been diluted in recent years. 
There is little evidence that the 
day-to-day work experience and 
organisation of the labour process 
are different from the realities of 
any large retailer, and pressures on 
extracting more from staff in terms 
of value-creation are evident. In its 
post-1990 expansion, JLP has been 
more successful in growing turnover 
than in growing profitability, 
creating pressures on whether 
surpluses support partner dividends 
for current partners, pensions 
provision for previous partners, 
or investment in expansion which 
may be in the interest of future 
partners. There are, therefore, very 
real tensions between the operation 
of JLP and the creation of value 
in JLP, past, present and future. 
While JLP has long enjoyed a very 
positive reputation for dealing 
fairly with suppliers, externalising 
parts of what were previously 
core parts of the business (such as 
distribution) has created tensions 
between extracting value (through 
tighter relationships with suppliers) 
and creating value, given that 
JLP’s competitive strategy is 
steeped in the importance of, and 
distinctiveness of, its customer 
service, which in turn is seen to be 
largely determined by the influence 
of partnership arrangements. Even 
in its espoused moral commitment 
to partners and stakeholders, JLP 
has to balance representing these 
interests in the short term against 
business (albeit not shareholder) 
pressures in both the short and 
long term. 
None of this should be read as a 
criticism of JLP and its operating 
model – committed not to 
shareholder value but to partners’ 
happiness – or of the evident 
(though contested) benefits of 
their model for employees. Instead 
we wish to reflect on the tensions 
between different parts of the 
value process even in what should 
be a favourable organisational 
context and to consider the 
dynamic nature of these tensions. 
Drivers and consequences of 
variation and choice in business 
models 
These business models exhibit 
variation in context, choices 
and consequences. Subject to 
varying product and labour 
market pressures, shaped in 
significant part by ownership 
characteristics and framed not just 
by regulation but by the wider 
activities of the state, business 
models are constructed in context 
to serve a hierarchy of interests 
and actors – often, however, in 
significant and visible tension with 
the interests of other relevant 
actors. In some versions, business 
models acknowledge the need for 
co-operation across stakeholders 
in value-creation which can impact 
directly on patterns of value-
capture. In others, the discipline 
of the market is used punitively to 
deliver value for one stakeholder 
group at the expense of others 
in sharing in value-capture. Yet 
timescales are always important, 
and the externalities of business 
models that deliver only for 
shareholders may threaten their 
longer-term sustainability. Business 
models drive management practice 
that shapes both value-creation 
and capture, but not always in 
alignment. Forms of governance 
and leadership closely tied to 
value-capture may be destructive 
to value-creation and forms of 
compensation, and reward tied to 
narrow financial values may do the 
same. But these are not inevitable 
outcomes and significant scope for 
strategic choice exists in all of the 
above business models. Some of 
these issues are addressed further 
in Sections 5 and 6 below. 
‘Forms of 
governance and 
leadership closely 
tied to value-
capture may be 
destructive to value-
creation and forms 
of compensation 
and reward tied to 
narrow financial 
values may do the 
same. But these 
are not inevitable 
outcomes, and 
significant scope 
for strategic choice 
exists.’ 
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5 Value, governance and leadership
The preceding discussion has 
looked at the dominant model of 
maximising shareholder value and 
alternative stakeholder models 
through the lens of ‘who captures 
value’, but these discussions 
run in tandem with debates 
on organisational or corporate 
governance. Shareholder value 
models are heavily predicated 
on the need to discipline firm 
leadership – senior management 
as the agents of stakeholders – to 
act in ways that are consistent 
with shareholder interests, often 
in the short term. Corporate 
governance sets the parameters 
for organisational decision-making 
processes that create value and 
frame who is involved in these 
processes, and how. 
Widely accepted international 
principles and protocols 
of corporate governance 
acknowledge the tensions 
between shareholders and other 
stakeholders in governance 
processes. The OECD’s principles 
of corporate governance 
clearly state that the ‘corporate 
governance framework should 
protect and facilitate the 
exercise of shareholders’ rights’ 
(OECD 2004, p18), while also 
highlighting that any corporate 
governance framework should 
take stakeholders into account 
and ‘should recognise the rights 
of stakeholders established by law 
or through mutual agreements 
and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, 
jobs, and the sustainability of 
financially sound enterprises 
including performance-enhancing 
mechanisms for employee 
participation’ (OECD 2004, 
p21), access to information and 
opportunities to communicate 
concerns. 
There is a well-developed 
literature on optimal governance 
arrangements (Aguilera and 
Jackson 2010) that reflects 
shareholder and stakeholder 
positions (Bottenberg et al 2017). 
Evidence on which form is superior, 
either in terms of business 
performance or other related 
outcomes such as innovation, 
continues to develop and to be 
contested. Shareholder-focused 
governance arrangements are 
considered beneficial in preventing 
less efficient self-interested 
managerial behaviour and focusing 
all attention to the single objective 
of profit maximisation. 
Stakeholder-focused governance 
arrangements, however, can 
be associated with lower costs 
of control, better information 
dispersal, greater access to 
valuable knowledge and other 
tacit resources and the benefits 
of more constructive intra-firm 
relationships. 
The task of organisational 
leadership is, of course, influenced 
by the nature and complexity of 
governance arrangements. A single 
focus on returns to shareholders 
and limited involvement by other 
stakeholders arguably reduces 
the complexity of leadership 
as a process. Involving multiple 
stakeholders and aligning their 
respective interests in delivering 
and distributing value may create 
greater leadership challenges. 
Yet the voluminous literature 
‘Widely accepted 
international 
principles 
and protocols 
of corporate 
governance 
acknowledge the 
tensions between 
shareholders and 
other stakeholders 
in governance 
processes.’ 
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on leadership largely takes 
the objectives of leadership – 
delivering value to shareholders 
and customers – as a given, and 
much research is instead devoted 
to the ‘how’ of leadership within 
an organisation, spawning an 
extensive debate on leaders’ 
values (Ogbonna and Harris 2000, 
Fu et al 2010), styles (Ogbonna 
and Harris 2000), competencies 
(Bolden and Gosling 2006), 
incentives and rewards (see 
Section 6 below). 
Stakeholder governance creates 
particular leadership challenges 
but also creates opportunities 
for leadership to be exercised 
towards multiple objectives and 
by a broader group of actors. 
Our previous discussion of family 
firms echoes a wider research 
base on the role of values in how 
private owners/shareholders 
define and pursue strategic and 
operational objectives beyond 
profit maximisation. In this case 
and others, leaders’ values may 
drive and shape stakeholder-
oriented value-creation strategies 
and management practices 
where corporate governance 
arrangements allow sufficient scope 
for the exercise of strategic choice. 
As Kochan and Rubinstein 
(2000) have argued, however, 
‘leadership and leadership values 
are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for stakeholder firms 
to emerge’, and stakeholder 
approaches may derive some 
of their benefits by tapping into 
distributed leadership assets and 
the value of non-management 
leadership. In their analysis of 
Saturn, Kochan and Rubinstein 
note the crucial importance 
of labour union leadership 
alongside company leadership 
in designing and delivering an 
effective stakeholder approach 
in a viable and competitive firm 
by harnessing employee voice, 
utilising employees’ skills and 
knowledge, and sharing risk 
and reward. The role of shared 
value needs to be stressed here: 
employee and union benefit was 
designed into Saturn’s strategy 
and governance from the outset, 
as is often the case in firms where 
mutual gains approaches are 
enshrined in formal partnership 
arrangements between employers, 
unions and employees (Johnstone 
and Wilkinson 2013). Even in this 
hospitable context for stakeholder 
engagement, it is clear that 
constant and ongoing adaptation 
characterised leadership and 
governance at Saturn, and Kochan 
and Rubinstein highlight both 
the risks entailed in leadership 
exit and succession and the need 
for collective adaptation of the 
governance rules, structures, 
practices and approaches that 
went beyond a focus on individual 
leaders. 
The legal and organisational 
foundation of corporate 
governance arrangements, 
variable over countries and firms, 
creates challenges in embedding 
stakeholder arrangements and in 
sustaining these in the context 
of leadership succession. As we 
will see in the following section, 
leadership and management 
accountabilities are more easily 
attached to formal measures of 
shareholder value than to multiple 
and conflicting stakeholder 
objectives, however perverse the 
outcomes of MSV (Salaman and 
Storey 2016). 
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6 Value, compensation and reward 
It is unarguable that in any system 
of rewards and sanctions, particular 
behaviours are embedded, 
incentivised or discouraged. In the 
accounting/finance/economics 
literatures, the standard theory of 
executive compensation in terms 
of its ability to align executive 
interests with that of shareholders 
is agency theory. Agency theory 
suggests that it is necessary to 
establish various types of market 
and contractual mechanisms to 
motivate or monitor the agents 
so that they will better align 
their interests with those of the 
shareholders. One such mechanism, 
which was extremely popular in 
the 1980s, was the ‘executive share 
option’. An IDS report for the High 
Pay Centre (2014) suggests that 
the Thatcher Government taxation 
policy further supported the 
rapid introduction of share option 
schemes in 1984, when options 
were exempted from income tax 
and subject only to capital gains 
tax. Drawing evidence from a 1995 
House of Commons Employee 
Committee Report, 1980–94, 
IDS (2014) noted the growing 
popularity of other types of bonus 
schemes and executive incentive 
arrangements. In practice, share 
options proved to be imperfect 
as an incentive mechanism. For 
example, the directors of poorly 
performing firms could make 
significant profits from their options 
if there was a general rise in the 
stock market. And ‘high-performing’ 
executives could make no money 
if there was a dramatic general fall 
in the stock market. Moreover, on 
exercising their options, executive 
interests would cease to be aligned 
with those of the shareholders. 
In the years since 1980, the 
compensation packages of senior 
executives in large corporations 
have become extremely complex 
with some ‘fixed’ elements (for 
example salary) while many more 
are ‘variable’ (depending on an 
array of performance metrics) 
with a significant shift from fixed 
pay towards variable pay, partly 
in the form of shares. IDS (2014) 
found that salary plus benefits only 
made up just over a fifth of the 
total earnings of FTSE 100 lead 
executives in 2012/13, and that the 
maximum bonus for FTSE 100 lead 
executives increased from 50% of 
salary in 1998 to 180% in 2013. 
IDS (2014) is concerned with 
whether there is a link between 
executive pay and performance. 
One of its overarching conclusions is 
that there is either no relationship, 
or, at best, a weak link between 
directors’ pay and performance. 
While the IDS report found little 
correlation between executive pay 
and performance, it is important 
to consider what the impact of 
executive pay might be8 if it does 
not correlate with performance 
when considering longitudinal data. 
Bennett and colleagues’ (2017) 
analysis of a large cross-sectional 
data set of the performance goals 
employed in executive incentive 
contracts found that companies 
that just exceed their earnings 
per share (EPS) goals had higher 
abnormal accruals (management 
of accounts) and lower research 
and development expenditures. In 
short, performance metrics might 
be achieved through failure to invest 
in the future and/or ‘accounting 
management’. Other academic 
work has considered company pay 
structures within organisations. 
Park (2017) examined the impact 
of pay disparity between the chief 
executive officer (CEO) and the 
next layer of top management 
team executives. Specifically, Park 
(2017) found that companies with a 
greater pay disparity between the 
CEO and the top management team 
also participated in real activities 
manipulation (for example giving 
price discounts to temporarily 
increase sales, overproduction to 
report lower cost of goods sold, 
and reduction of discretionary 
expenditures such as research and 
development and staff training). 
In summary, this section has 
provided a brief review of attempts 
to align executive pay with the 
interests of shareholders. Executive 
remuneration is incredibly complex 
and IDS (2014) found that executive 
pay over the 2000–2013 period far 
outstripped corporate performance. 
However, there is a relationship 
between what is described in the 
literature as ‘earnings management’ 
and executive pay. ‘Earnings 
management’ can either take the 
form of book-keeping entries and/
or the manipulation of the real 
activities of companies in order to 
maximise performance metrics. The 
latter practice can too easily have a 
negative impact on the long-term 
prosperity of the organisation.
8  And executive pay is dwarfed by the compensation awarded to hedge fund managers. The Guardian newspaper reported that the world’s top 25 hedge 
fund managers earned $13 billion in 2015. This could be compared with the highest-paid banker, Jamie Dimon (JP Morgan CEO) who was paid $27 million. 
Available at: www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/10/hedge-fund-managers-salaries-billions-kenneth-griffin-james-simon
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7 Summary 
There is a general consensus 
across a range of disciplinary 
perspectives that the value process 
represents a trajectory from 
human capital and its deployment 
to the creation of value. This is 
reflected in critical perspectives 
that contend that all value stems 
from labour, in HR debates on 
acquiring, developing, utilising 
and retaining human capital and 
also in the finance literature in 
research that suggests that capital 
markets themselves value human 
capital as an essential component 
of value-creation. Moreover, there 
is evidence from HR, finance and 
accounting research to suggest the 
better maintenance of employees, 
just like tangible fixed assets, will 
further improve value-creation. 
Alongside these debates, however, 
is evidence that shareholder value 
pressures on value-capture leads 
to the adoption of business models 
where value-capture predominates, 
leading to a proliferation of and 
renewed emphasis on accounting 
metrics, often at individual as 
well as organisational level, that 
in turn drives management, 
employment and work practices 
that may impact negatively on 
human capital formation, job and 
employment quality in the short 
and the long term. Many of these 
practices are value-destructive at 
an organisational level. 
Moreover, many of these practices 
impose significant externalities on 
individuals on whom organisational 
risk is heavily loaded; on families 
and communities disrupted by 
work insecurity, unstable work 
patterns and low pay; and on 
the wider society, for example, 
in necessitating welfare transfers 
to address low or variable 
pay, reducing tax revenue 
opportunities, increasing health 
care demands and specifically 
health spend, as well as limiting 
the return on public investment 
in education, learning and skills 
and in driving or sustaining 
inequality, constraining growth at 
national level (Cingano 2014). The 
key question, therefore, is what 
efforts can be made to address 
this value-creation/value-capture 
tension and to disincentivise value-
destructive business models and 
management practices? At least in 
part, what is valued is defined by 
what is measured and reported, 
and recent years have witnessed 
growing interest in HR metrics 
and accounting measures such as 
human capital or social accounting 
that more accurately reflect the 
role of humans and human capital 
in value-creation and, albeit 
implicitly, reflects the interests 
of other stakeholders in value-
capture.  
In Part 2, we review current and 
possible indicators of value-
creation before considering their 
potential effectiveness alongside 
other forms of intervention that 
might help negate the negative 
consequences of a singular pursuit 
of shareholder value. We conclude 
Part 2 with a summary of findings 
from both reports and implications 
for theory and practice.
‘The key question, 
therefore, is what 
efforts can be made 
to address this 
value-creation/
value-capture 
tension and to 
disincentivise 
value-destructive 
business models 
and management 
practices?’ 
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